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Abstract
REFERENCE, COHERENCE, MEANING: A REALIST EPISTEMOLOGY OF ART
K. Michael Hays
Submitted to the Department of Architecture on 11 May 1979,
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Architecture in Advanced Studies.
The aim of this thesis is to explore some of the consequences
that a position of realism with respect to interpretive and
explanatory theories of art has for the problems of truth,
objectivity, and meaning in theories of art. A realist posi-
tion is defended against the claim that theories in art may
be more or less plausible, but may not be true because they
are radically underdetermined by any possible evidence. In
the respective sections, the thesis
1) argues that a merely extensionally correct account of the
properties and features of the artwork cannot provide an ad-
equate explication of meaning and suggests that the meaning
of artworks is accessed by a socio-linguistic process of
theoretical reasoning and deliberation which supplements and
extends the pre-existing body of perceptual knowledge;
2) argues that there is a relation of correspondence between
our theoretical language and the world which makes possible
the use of language in the social acquisition, dissemination,
and refinement of knowledge and suggests that the tendency,
over time, is for the rationally conducted inquiry after know-
ledge about works of art to result in theories which are in-
creasingly accurate accounts of the actual relations obtaining
between the theoretical entities quantified over in the theories;
3) suggests that theories in art may reveal a complexity in
their structure such that the theory-laden constraints on
critical judgments and interpretive statements which act to
produce consensus among competent judges may be consensus
producing because they are indirectly evidential of the
approximate truth of the theories which account for them.
While the arguments in the thesis are speculative, they suggest
that a reconsideration of the possibility of objectively true
critical judgments and theories of art is in order.
Thesis Supervisor: Henry A. Millon
Title: Professor of History and Architecture
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0. INTRODUCTION
A view of knowledge that acknowledges that the sphere of
knowledge is wider than the sphere of "science" seems to
me to be a cultural necessity if we are to arrive at a
sane and human view of ourselves or of science.
Hilary Putnam
Recent developments in the philosophy of science are
forcing us to reconsider many issues concerning the nature
of our knowledge. The philosophical position known as realism
is particularly challenging, and particularly relevant not
only to epistemological inquiries regarding the physical
sciences but to those regarding other modes of knowledge as
well. The aim of this thesis is to explore some of the con-
sequences that a realist position has for the problems of
meaning, truth, and objectivity in theories of art.
There is a widely held view that important dissimila-
rities between theories in science and theories in art pre-
clude anything like "truth" and "knowledge" being part of the
sphere of art. I. C. Jarvie has expressed the argument for
this view as follows:
There seems to be a clear-cut difference between
science, where statements are true or false, and
quarrels can be settled, and which therefore is objec-
tive; and criticism of the arts, where statements have
the appearance of being true or false, and thus ojec-
tively decidable, but which in fact reduces to matters
of taste. We seem to be misled by our language into
thinking there is an epistemological symmetry between
the statements 'The heliocentric hypothesis is true'
and 'The statement "this play is first-rate," is true'
simply because they both predicate the property 'truth'
of certain statements. However, since there is no way
of testing the second statement we should not allow
its grammatical similarity to mislead us into thinking
there is an epistemological similarity: that there is
anything like 'knowledge' of what is artistically first-
rate. In art we are merely swapping opinions; in science
we are talking about something with an objective cor-
relative. It is a fact that critics give different
appraisals of the same works of art. Disputes arise
between those holding different views, but these disputes
do not get resolved; they end up, as they started, in
straight clashes of opinion. From this lack of unanimity,
and from the uselessness or argument in trying to
settle the differences, it can be concluded that there
are no known means of saying whether critics' statements
are true or false; no known and accepted standards in
criticism of the arts; and thus no objectivity in such
criticism.
Implicitly or explicitly this situation is contrasted
with that (mistakenly) thought to be the case in science,
where there seems to be a certain unanimity, and where
those disputes which arise appear to end with one side
or the other being proved right. In science there are
standards and thus there is objectivity.2
This view is based not only on a mistaken view of theories in
science but, I contend, on a mistaken view of theories in art
as well. In the respective sections of this thesis I will
suggest that (1) theories of art should be seen as rational
inquiries after knowledge, (2) there is a relation of cor-
respondence between our theoretical language and the world
which makes possible the social acquisition, dissemination,
and refinement of knowledge, and (3) the structure of the
inquiry is such that the sorts of considerations involved
in determining the acceptability of art theories may lead
us to increasingly accurate accounts of the actual relations
obtaining between entities quantified over in the theories.
It will become obvious that the work of Richard Boyd
and Hilary Putnam is fundamental to this thesis. Indeed,
in one sense, this thesis is an application of some of their
ideas to theories of art. It is not, however, an exposition
of their position. Rather, their work in epistemology is
presupposed, as is some contemporary work in aesthetics,
particularly that of Arthur Danto. (These and other perti-
nent works are listed in the bibliography.) My hope is that
this thesis will be a meaningful extension of the work of
these philosophers and provide a program for the development
of a realist epistemology of art.
l. MEANING IN ART AS AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL NOTION
This section of the thesis seeks to provide a context
for the discussion of explanatory and interpretive theories
of art by suggesting that the meaning of artworks is accessed
by a socio-linguistic process of theoretical reasoning and
deliberation which supplements and extends the pre-existing
body of perceptual knowledge. That meaning is fundamentally
an epistemological notion is set against the doctrine that
merely an extensionally correct account of the properties
and features of the artwork can provide an adequate under-
standing of meaning.
1.1 Intention, Intension, and Extension in Art
The reconstruction of the intention of the artist is
one of the most important methods of securing the meaning
of a work of art in standard art history and theory at the
present time. The idea here, though few art historians or
theorists would state it in this way, is to find a criterion
for belonging to the extension of the term or predicate used
to describe the work, in the strong sense of finding a way
5of recognizing if a thing or property falls into the exten-
sion.1  In looking for such a criterion for belonging to
the extension of predicates like 'represents b' or 'expresses
0,' the artist's conception of what he intented to represent
or express would seem to provide a likely place to start. 2
This could be an unfortunate situation, since the artist's
conception is not always available to us, if not for the
fact that, as Richard Wollheim points out, the artist qua
artist is also a spectator; that is, what spectators (we)
see in a work and what the artist intends in making it are
not all that far apart. "For, if the artist intends to re-
present, say, b, then though there are many kinds of picture
that he might make while entertaining this intention, the
kind of picture in which he can be held to express or
implement this intention is restricted: as a general rule
. . . it is restricted to the kind of picture in which we
can see b." 3 ". . . in the making of any work of art a
concept is operative. It is not simply that in describing
a work of art after the event, as it were, we use concepts
to characterize them or catch their characteristics; but
the concepts have already been at work in the artist's
mind in the determination of these characteristics: Indeed,
one criterion of a description's adequacy is that in it the
concepts that have helped fashion the work reappear. Thus,
the description of the work is parasitic upon the description
under which it was made."4 A correct description or inter-
pretation of an artwork, then, must copy the concepts under
which the work was produced. In this way, a criterion of
extension which makes a direct appeal to intention, makes
an indirect appeal to intension where the intension of an
aesthetic term or aesthetic predicate applied to a particular
artwork is taken as the concepts associated with that art-
work. Moreover, on this view intension determines exten-
sion where extension is taken as the set of things or
properties the term or predicate is true of. Look again
at Wollheim's account for the production of an art object:
When we make a work of art, we make it under a certain
description; a concept, or hierarchy of concepts, enters
into the process and plays a causal role in the determina-
tion of what is made. Furthermore, the bodily or manual
activity of making the work has variations which coincide
with variations of the psychological state; the artistic
activity is formed upon a direct correspondence between
inner feelings and an outer object which is selected or
created or somehow isolated as discreetly matching our
feelings. "So we bring into being . . . correlates to
match our inner state. "5
This view (which is not unique to Wollheim) insists
upon the meaning of a work of art being determined by a
conceptual activity which is identified by reference to
what the resultant configuration can be seen as representa-
tive or expressive of. Such a theory of artistic meaning
is founded upon a general theory of meaning which Hilary
Putnam, Stephen Swartz, and others have termed the
"traditional" theory of meaning. The central features of
what is here meant by a traditional theory of meaning are
the following:
1.1.1 Each meaningful term of a theory has some meaning,
concept, intension, or cluster of features associa-
ted with it. It is this meaning that is known or
present to the mind when the term is understood.
Thus, it is assumed that knowing the meaning of
a term is a matter of being in a certain psycholo-
gical state. This assumption is active whether we
take the earlier version of the view that concepts
are something mental and, since the meaning of a
term is a concept, then meanings are individualized
mental entities; or the more recent view stemming
from the "anti-psychologism" of Frege and Carnap
that meanings are public property, that the same
meaning can be "grasped" by more than one person
and at different times, and that concepts are
therefore to be identified with abstract entities
rather than mental entities; for grasping these
abstract entities is still an individual psycho-
logical act.
1.1.2 The meaning of a term (in the sense of concept or
intension) or intension determines its extension in
the sense that something falls in the extension of
the term if and only if it has the characteristics
included in the meaning, concept, intension, (or,
in the case of the cluster theory, "enough" of
these features). (In many versions, the meaning or
concept of the term may include only "observable"
criteria for the application of the term.) This
characteristic, which is also an unargued assumption,
admits the possibility that two terms can differ
in intension and yet have the same extension.
Wollheim implies this. ". . . two different
activities might for some part of their course
coincide in what they ask of the agent: nevertheless,
there is reason to think that even over this part,
the agent is engaged in one activity rather than
another, and the answer, which one it is, is supplied
by the description under which he acted. So boiling
an egg and making tea coincide for the early part
of their course, yet, even while the agent is still
waiting for the water to come to the boil, we can
say, and so can he, which of the two he is doing."6
Yet, it is taken that two terms cannot differ in
extension in the sense of a way of recognizing if
a given thing falls into the extension as we saw
earlier.
Hilary Putnam, in "The Meaning of Meaning," argues that
assumptionsl.l.l and 1.1.2 are not jointly satisfied "by any
notion, let alone any notion of meaning, "7 and claims that "it
is possible for two speakers to be in exactly the same psycho-
logical state even though the extension of the term A in the
idiolect of the one is different from the extension of the term
A in the idiolect of the other." 8 He shows this by using
his devise of Twin Earth, a place supposed to be exactly
like Earth except that the liquid called 'water' is not
H20 but a different liquid with a complicated formula
XYZ which has the same superficial properties of water and
is indistinguishable from water at normal temperatures and
pressures. Simplified, the story is that an occupant of
Earth, Oscar 2, can be supposed to have identical feelings,
thoughts, etc., yet the meaning of 'water' to Oscar 1 on
Earth is not the same as 'water' to Oscar 2 on Twin Earth.
Without rehearsing all the arguments in detail, the point
of this example is that an entity may satisfy the criteria
for being X yet not be an instance of X, or it may fail to
satisfy the criteria yet nonetheless be an instance of X.
The psychological state of the speaker does not determine
the extension or the meaning of the term.9 Now, the
implications of this argument have the effect of not merely
refining but refuting the traditional theory of meaning
outlined above. Thus, if my analogy is correct, a theory
of meaning in art based on intensions is founded on a faulty
theory of general meaning. We will return to the notion of
psychological concepts later. First, let us examine an
alternative theory of meaning based on extensional truth-
conditional semantics.
1.2 Davidsonian Semantics
Donald Davidson, in "Truth and Meaning," 10 suggests
11
that the apparatus of extensional truth-conditional semantics
might provide a model for a theory of meaning for natural
languages. Accordingly, an adequate theory of meaning for
a particular language L will satisfy the following conditions:
1.2.1 It will, in some appropriate sense, "give the meaning"
of each sentence of L.
1.2.2 It will show how the meaning of a sentence is a
function of its parts and structure. For example,
L might have a set of rules specifying (a) the
truth conditions for each "short sentence" Sl,
(b) truth conditions for larger sentences as a
function of the way it is built up out of shorter
sentences. While there cannot be a rule for every
sentence of L, there should be a rule for each
sentence type.
1.2.3 It will do 1.1 and 1.2 in a suitably empirical,
testable way.
Furthermore, the theory for L that satisfies these constraints
would, according to Davidson, be a Tarski-type truth theory
for L. That is, in a theory of meaning for L, a schema of
the form
s means that p
12
where 's' is a structural description of a sentence and 'p'
is another sentence which "gives the meaning" of 's', gives
way to the form
's' is T iff p
where 's' is replaced by a structural description of a
sentence and 'p' is replaced by that sentence itself, and
'T' is a predicate co-extensive with 'truth' in L.
Two further points should be noticed:
1.2.4 It is not made an explicit requirement for a truth
theory's counting as a theory of meaning that 'p'
be a translation of 's'.
1.2.5 One must begin with a finite set of sentences for
which truth-conditions are to be laid down directly.
1.3 Davidsonian Semantics and Art
The initial appeal of a Davidsonian theory of meaning
to the epistemology of art is related to its virtues as a
theory of meaning for a language. First, it provides us
with a way of giving the statement, "The meaning of a work
of art is a function of the meaning of its parts" a precise
and non-metaphorical sense. For example, in L, one of the
rules of the kind 1.2.2b might be: If S is (Sl & S2) for
some sentences Sl, S2, then S is true if and only if Sl,
S2 are both true. Notice that in this example the truth
condition specified for sentences of the type (Sl & S2)
performs the job of specifying the meaning of the structure
( & ). This is the sense in which a truth definition
can be a theory of meaning.11
To fill this out with a relevant problem of aesthetics,
let us borrow from Nelson Goodman's analysis of representa-
tion and expression and Richard Wollheim's criticisms of
the analysis.12 Goodman advances a thesis that relates
two of the most established problems in aesthetics -- the
nature of representation and the nature of expression.
Contrary to many traditional accounts of the two modes
which have tried to locate the difference between repre-
sentation and expression in the difference between the
kinds of things represented and the kinds of things
expressed, Goodman suggests that the nature of each may
be clarified by relating them in a common formula: "What
is expressed subsumes the picture as an instance much as
the picture subsumes what it represents." 13 The relation
common to the two modes is one of "denotation;" their
difference lies in the direction in which the denotation
runs rather than in the things represented or expressed,
which are not necessarily of two different kinds. Thus, the
picture denotes what it represents and is denoted by what
it expresses.
We will take up the problem of expression later; for
the moment, let us examine representation alone: Goodman
distinguishes between two senses of representation: "Saying
that a picture represents a soandso is . . . highly ambi-
guous as between saying what the picture denotes and saying
what kind of picture it is. ,,14 More precisely, we can
distinguish between the two forms
1.3.A a represents b
1.3.B a is a b-representing-picture (or simply b-picture)
This distinction is necessary in order to account for cases
where it is true of a picture a that it represents something
b, but false that there is an x such that a denotes x; that
is, the assertion does not permit existential generalization
with respect to b. Thus, in 1.3.A, 'represents' is a two-
place relational predicate qualifying a and b such that the
existence of b can be inferred. In 1.3.B, 'represents' is
construed as a component of an "unbreakable" one-place predi-
cate where the existence of b is not implied.
But, where are we with respect to the notion of meaning
with this "unbreakable" predicate? The formulation of
unbreakability cannot explain the fact that inference of
b's existence cannot come from 'a is a b-picture' for it
simply incorporates this fact. Nor can it explain the
relation of the two senses 1.3.A and 1.3.B. Moreover,
even if we were to accept these deficiencies temporarily
there is still another problem that is inescapable. The
difficulty here is this: For 'b-picture' in 1.3.B, there
could be substitution instances of unlimited complexity.
So by introducing an infinite number of prime locutions
into the language of art, this version of the unbreaka-
bility thesis offends against Davidson's basic requirement
of teachability and requirement 1.2.5.
Wollheim suggests that a weaker version of the
unbreakability thesis may avoid this kind of problem as
well as provide explanations for the previous two. In
relation to the notion of the unbreakable predicate
Wollheim argues from three points:
1.3.1 Though from 'a is a b-picture' we cannot infer the
existence of b, we can infer the existence of a
picture.
1.3.2 It is essential to Goodman's account of representation
that we can classify representational pictures into
kinds of pictures (as opposed to style, etc.) by
virtue of the fact that they are pictures.
1.3.3 We can recognize pictures as b-pictures (or c-pictures
or d-pictures) without first being able to recognize
bs (or cs, ds).
1.3.4 If we are at first unable to recognize bs, then we
become able to do so once we are able to classify
pictures as b-pictures. 15
1.3.1 and 1.3.2 establish and confirm the detachability of
'picture' from 'b-picture' and suggest that a weaker inter-
pretation of the unbreakability thesis may have to be accep-
ted, one in which only 'b-', that is that which fills the
gap between 'a' and 'picture', can be taken as unbreakable.
However, Goodman points out that there are locutions or
inscriptions which have parts that denote, and so are not
"atomic", but can nevertheless be unbreakable in the sense
of "prime": ". . . the sematic term 'prime' is only par-
tially parallel to the syntactic term 'atomic'; for while
no proper part of an atomic inscription is an inscription,
parts of a prime inscription may have compliants. The
inscription is prime in that compliants of its parts,
combined in the specified way, do not make up a compliant of
the whole."l6 Now, nothing in Wollheim's 1.3.1 and 1.3.2
counters this formulation. For, while the recognition of the
notion of 'picture' is detachable from the larger expression,
its particular compliant obviously cannot be. Furthermore, if
we concede to operate with an unbreakability- criterion based
on truth-conditions or acceptance-conditions rather than
denotation, then 1.3.3 and 1.3.3' establish that, if the con-
cept of 'picture' is kept in mind, then given the acceptance-
condition of 'picture', knowing the acceptance-condition of 'b'
completes the meaning of the whole expression. Thus, the
meaning of a locution is determined by the acceptance-conditions
of the resultant constituents combined in a certain specified
way as in 1.2.2
We have said that Goodman's formulation (argued largely
from a nominalist position) explains very little about the
relationship of 1.3.A and 1.3.B. In speaking of "representa-
tion-as", however, he does explicitly insist on one relation:
1.3.C a represents x as b iff a is a b-picture and a
denotes x
That is, 'a represents x as b' is taken as equivalent to the
conjunction from which it follows. At this point, Wollheim
postulates an extreme view of the relationship between 1.3.A
and 1.3.B:
1.3.C' If a is a b-picture, then, a denotes x iff (3x) (x=b)
In this view, denotation is accounted for in terms of kind
of picture plus certain testable facts about the world, that
is, instantiation, thereby responding to desideratum 1.2.3.
From 1.3.C' the argument that Pickwick pictures denote
nothing, for example, would be something like this: Since
there is no such thing as Pickwicks, Pickwick-pictures
denote nothing. Goodman in fact argues that since what
Pickwick-pictures purportedly denote is fictive, then
Pickwick-pictures denote nothing. That is, he invokes
purported denotation or intention rather than ostensive
non-instantiation. (Wollheim sees the less than extreme
view 1.3.C as opening a gap in the relationship between
a's being a b-picture (1.3.B) and a's denoting x (l.3.A):
while denotation is still the core of representation in
the sense of 1.3.A, the sense of 1.3.B seems to depend
on converse denotation in that it depends on whether
predicates like 'b-picture' or 'c-picture' apply to it;
it therefore tends toward the position of expression, an
undesirable confusion of terms.)
Thus Wollheim's modifications of Goodman's denotation
schema provide an example of how a finitely axiomized
theory based on a truth- or acceptance-condition for the
language can provide a model for a theory of meaning in
works of art where meaning is based on representation.
Before considering expression, one more point should be
19
added.
The initial appeal of a Davidsonian theory of meaning
is, as we have said, that it gives the meaning of a repre-
sentation as a function of the meaning of its parts. The
second virtue is that it tells us how we can assign a
distinct meaning to any sentence, not by a mapping relation
of sentences to their semantic representations, as in
traditional semantics, but by giving semantic properties,
or at least one semantic property, by using it in an
exemplification of its standard use which it has in talk
about the world. For example, the sentence
'snow is white' is true iff snow is white
is an exemplification of the use we might put it to in
order to express our belief that snow is white. Similarly,
something satisfies 'brown' iff it is brown
states a learnable relation between a word and a set of
things, thereby fulfilling the basic requirement of teach-
ability.
It is not difficult to see how this works with the
problem of representation that we have been considering:
We have a theory which entails, for each of the possibly
complex predicates F, a theorem of the form:
x satisfies F iff Wx
where 'W' is replaced by an expression of the metalanguage
in use. The problem, as we have seen, is to construct addi-
tional clauses which, together with the original clauses,
will entail, by principles faithful to the senses of the
terms used in them, theories having the pattern of
x satistifies 'is a representation
of b' iff x is a representation of b
We should have one such theorem for each of our original
predicates. The additional clauses give the meaning of the
'representation of' construction by means of terms in use,
in our example, in terms of "denotation."
Let us now turn to the problem of expression relative
to Davidsonian semantics: Harold Osborne has summarized the
traditional expression theory as follows:
The underlying theory is, in its baldest form, that
the artist lives through a certain experience; he then
makes an artifact which in some way embodies that
experience; and through appreciative contemplation of
this artifact other men are able to duplicate in their
own minds the experience of the artist. What is con-
veyed to them is . . . an experience of their own as
similar as possibli 7to the artist's experience in all
its aspects. . .
21
Alan Tormey, in Concepts of Expression, criticizes the
traditional expression theory's assumption that there is a
noncontingent and specifiable relation between the state
of the artist and the expressive qualities of the art
object, and the theory's consequent assertion that the
artist necessarily expresses something (feeling, attitude,
idea, mood, etc.) through his art.18 Tormey sees this view
as arising, at least in part, from a failure to distinguish
between two logically independent forms of expression:
1.3.E '0 expression', instances of which are descriptions
of certain observable features of a situation
1.3.F 'expression of 0', instances of which are inference
warranting, relating some intentional state of a
person to particular aspects of his observable behavior
Tormey observes that if works of art were expressions of
states of persons, then this would commit us to treating
all works as autobiographical revelations and to a peculiar
way of verifying or falsifying the descriptions of the
expressive qualities of art through the discovery of truths
about the inner life of the artist. Relevant statements
about art, then "must be interpreted as intensionally
equivalent to syntactic form 1.3.E; that is, they are to be
understood as propositions containing 'expression' or
'expressive' as syntactic parts of a one-place predicate
denoting some perceptible quality, aspect, or gestalt of
the work itself."19 Such statements cannot be instances
of 1.3.F "since it would make no sense to ask for the
intentional object" of the work of art.2 0
With this distinction in mind, what can we say about
meaning based on expression? In Davidsonian terms, only
this:
1.3.G x satisfies 'is an 0 expression' iff x displays
a.set of properties [c] such that [c] is denoted
by a certain description of 0
But two difficulties arise here:
The first is, how can x express 0 to the exclusion of
y or z or g so long as [c] remains compatible with a range
of expressive properties which includes y, z, _, and 0? If
the postulate 1.3.G is accepted, that is, if there is indeed
an equivalence of an expression 0 in x and a set of descriptive
properties [c], then it follows that [c] must be unambiguously
correlated with 0. But, obviously more than one work of art
can be justifiably described as sad, for example, without
it following that the works all possess identical sets of
23
non-expressive properties. Furthermore, it would be
difficult in many cases to say whether one work were
expressive of despair, anxiety, resignation, fear, etc.,
without resorting to the overly generous concession that the
work has a conjunction of all the expressive properties
falling within the compatibility range of the work's non-
expressive properties, i.e. (despair-anxiety-resignation-
fear-etc.>; or the epistemologically pointless converse,
assigning members of the compatibility range disjunctively
to the work, i.e. (despair or anxiety or resignation or
fear>. We must therefore reject the postulate that [c] is
uniquely constitutive of 0. A given set of non-expressive
properties may be compatible with, and constitutive of, any
one of a range of expressive properties; the relation of
[c] and 0 is such that [c] may be wholly constitutive of,
but cannot be unambiguously correlated with 0.
The second difficulty with 1.3.G is this: If knowing
the meaning of an artwork (or more strictly, the represen-
tative or expressive parts of an artwork) is equated with
knowing what it is for it to be the case that the artwork
stands in the appropriate relation to certain properties or
entities, then knowledge of what the acceptance condition is
is presupposed in the understanding of every artwork. In the
case of representation, if Wollheim is right, we are able
to classify pictures as b-pictures without first being
able to recognize bs; but we cannot know the meaning of
b-picture until we know the acceptance condition of 'b' as
well as 'picture.' We must know, for example, that being
a male figure with a knife satisfies 'represents St.
Batholomew', that a female figure with a peach in her hand
satistifies 'is a personification of veracity', that being
a group of figures seated at a dinner table in a certain
arrangement and in certain poses satisfies 'represents the
Last Supper', and so forth, before we can apprehend even
a minimal level of meaning in St. Bartholomew-pictures,
veracity-pictures, or Last-Supper pictures, respectively.21
But in the case of inventive artworks which institute novel
expressions of some sort or new conventions that are not
readily collected as admissable expressions, in what could
this knowledge of acceptance conditions consist? In these
later cases we can only discover that the work has such and
such a meaning by procedures other than "reading" and
classifying the work of art, procedures involving comparing
the work with other works of art, making deductive and
inductive inferences, testing those inferences, and discus-
sing the artwork with other competent judges. Knowledge
of truth conditions cannot be presupposed in any way by
this process of rational inquiry. The definition 1.3.G
may thus be extensionally correct, but it cannot tell us
anything about the meaning of '0 expression' without
translating '0'. The problem is that, in general, the
only expressions which both have properties coextensive
with [c] and have roughly the same meaning as 0 but not
Y, z, or g, are 0 expressions. So if we rule out truth
definitions such as 1.3.G on the grounds that they tell
us nothing about the meaning of '0 expression' and if we
rule out such forms of expression as 1.3.F on the grounds
that they do no more than attribute intentional properties
of a certain sort to works of art, then we are so far left
with nothing which would count as an adquate theory of
expressive meaning.
Now, while the virtues of the theory of meaning we
have been considering may remain undisturbed, and at this
point we cannot be absolutely sure that they do, we never-
theless cannot expect the theory to give meaning of more
than a few types of works of art, specifically those that
represent something which we already know the meaning of.
The hope of a Davidsonian theory of meaning was that
one could conclude that a sentence p would constitute an
adequate translation into the metalanguage of a representa-
tion or expression in the object language designated by a
structural description s and therefore that the sentence
s is T iff p
was a meaning-giving sentence provided
a) the T-sentence was true
b) the T-sentence was a theorem of a finitely axiomized
theory which entailed a true T-sentence for every repre-
sentation or expression of an infinite language upon the
basis of the structure of those representations or
expressions.
We have now seen that there can be axioms which preserve
the truth of all the T-sentences over as many T-sentences
as there are instances in which the expressions occur, but
are ambiguous or inaccurately correlated if construed as
giving the meaning of the individual expressions. Moreover,
we have also seen that we cannot presuppose knowledge of
truth conditions in the case of expression. Whether we
attempt to impose more stringent conditons upon a theory
of truth conditions in order to reach an adequate theory of
truth conditions as meaning-giving is ultimately a termino-
logical question, once we accept the following:
1.3.4 For many art objects, an extensionally correct truth
definition can be given for the properties of an
artwork which is not a theory of meaning of the
artwork; being able to classify an artwork is not
equated with knowing the meaning of the artwork.
1.3.5 There must be conditions in a theory of meaning
which have the effect of ensuring that the sentences
on the right-hand sides of the theory's T-sentence
give the meaning of those on the left, that is they
must provide an explication or a translation (compare
1.2.4).
1.3.6 The conditions, 1.3.4 and 1.3.5, if they are to
produce more on the right side of a T-sentence
than the sentence s itself or merely a syntactic
variant of s, will involve employment of social
and psychological concepts. 22
Now, it seems that if we concede that social and
psychological concepts must have a place in the determi-
nation of meaning, we have come full circle back to the
problem of intension in 1.1. But, if meaning cannot be
identified with intension, where intension is taken in the
sense of the individual's concepts, and if meaning cannot
be identified with extension either, then what is left of
the notion of meaning? Putnam outlines two plausible direc-
tions: 23
1.3.7 We could retain the identification of meaning with
concepts and give up the idea that meaning deter-
mines extension.
1.3.8 We could identify 'meaning' with an ordered n-tuple
of entities, one of which is extension; this makes
it true that a difference in extension is ipso facto
a difference in meaning, but totally abandons the
- idea that a difference in meaning demands a differ-
ence in the psychological states or the hierarchy
of concepts of the individuals who assign the
meaning.
Now 1.3.7 is the direction that most art historians and
theorists would take. But, I am not convinced that this
is the only direction. It will be interesting to examine
a theory of meaning for art following the direction of 1.3.8.
1.4 A Proposal for a Theory of Meaning in Art
The notion of "meaning" in art which I propose we adopt
would locate the meaning of an artwork neither in the con-
struing of artworks as linguistic or quasi-linguistic
utterances nor in the picking out of features or properties
which would be identified with meaning, but rather in the
understanding of and truth about artworks which explanatory
and interpretive theories afford us.24 Such an epistemological
account of meaning in art depends on meaning being a sev-
eral component affair of the sort Putnam has suggested.
Accordingly, a predicate which (partially) gives the meaning
of an artwork could be described by a finite sequence whose
components would include at least the following:
(intrinsic) (external)
syntactic semantic conventional referential
In this sequence, I take the syntactic component to be the
purely formal configuration of the object (or portion of the
object) in question; the semantic component is the subject
matter, function, etc. Both of these components are present
in the work. But the account also allows for the contribu-
tion of hypothesized understanding or locally standardized
sets of beliefs associated with but external to the artwork;
this is the conventional component, which may be inaccurate.
It is this component which accounts for the certain minimal
amount of information necessary for the discussion of meaning.
It includes procedures which are understood to be apt for
the perception and detection of meaningful features of art-
works and for the testing of alternative explanatory schemes.
But it is, finally, the referential component which is concer-
ned with truth. This component makes it possible that con-
ventional, conceptual change be accompanied by referential and
ontological stability. The mechanisms for fixing reference
are typically known only to a subset of the collective
linguistic body -- the experts to whom the rest of the
community defers judgments involving reference in a "linguis-
tic division of labor."25
I have said that the conventional component may be
inaccurate. Yet, many conventions often do in fact capture
features possessed by paradigmatic members of the class of
art and are often methodologically efficacious in producing
reliable knowledge. But while the procedures for discussing
and testing hypotheses may be conventional, there is no
way the reliability of these procedures could merely be a
matter of convention. In what follows I will be concerned
to argue that where our hypotheses and procedures function
reliably relative to a body of evidence, it must be the
case that their reliability rests upon the accuracy of the
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particular relations between observable or theoretical
entities as represented by the collateral theories which
account for the evidence; that is, their reliability rests
upon the referential component of meaning. Of course this
does not mean that, in general, the evidence for a theory
is evidence that the relations it describes between entities
exhaust those relations obtaining between them. But it does
mean that evidence for a theory is evidence that those
relations it describes and not others incompatible with them,
operate to produce the phenomena for which the theory accounts.
An account of meaning such as that I have proposed
rests on the following three fundamental claims:
1.4.1 There is a relation of correspondence between
language and the world which makes it possible that
our explanatory and interpretive theories of art
have genuine empirical content when the terms of
these theories are understood as referring to
extralinguistic features of art objects and extra-
linguistic causal relations among theoretical enti-
ties rather than as reflecting a relatively arbitrary
linguistic convention.
1.4.2 Our explanatory and interpretive theories of art
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objects are empirical hypotheses in the sense that
(a) the truth or falsity of our critical judgments
depends on facts which are not experiential facts,
facts which are not about sensations or associations,
facts which are not about aesthetic experience or
any logically equivalent experience, and (b) an
explanatory statement or critical judgment can be
false even though it follows from our theory (plus
auxiliary hypotheses) and is consistent with all
observational evidence.
1.4.3 Acquiring new knowledge is possible only if certain
of our background and collateral theories about
causal relations between entities are already true.
Claims 1.4.1, 1.4.2, and 1.4.3 constitute a realist episte-
mological position. It is a major part of the realist
program to offer an explanation for the reliability of our
theories, and for the legitimacy of ontological commitment
to theoretical entities. Richard Boyd argues that realism
offers the broad outline of an explanation in this:
1.4.4 Experimental evidence for a theory which describes
causal relations between theoretical (that is,
unobservable) entities is evidence not only for the
truth of the observational consequences of the
theory, but is also evidence for the truth of even
its non-observational laws and, hence, for the truth
of the as yet untested observational consequences
deduced from them.26 Thus the experimental evidence
for a theory Ti, counts as indirect experimental
evidence for a subsequent theory T2 which preserves
the accurate theoretical knowledge and observational
consequence of Tl as a limiting case. If the terms
of Tl are understood as having referents (that is,
as being true in the realist sense) and one's seman-
tic theory incorporates Putnam's principle of the
benefit of the doubt -- the principle that one
should interpret previous theories so that they make
as much sense as possible in the light of current
knowledge27 -- "then it will be a constraint on T2,
it will limit the class of candidate-theories, that
T2 must have this property, the property that from
its standpoint one can assign referents to the terms
of Tl. And again if I do not use the notions of
truth and reference . . . if all I use are 'global'
properties of the order of 'simplicity' and 'leads
to true predictions,' then I will have no analogue
of this constraint, I will not be able to narrow
the class of candidate-theories in this way. ,28
In the remainder of this paper I will defend a realist
epistemology of art against the following thesis which I
will call the Conventionalist Thesis:
(CT) Given any theory which contains non-observational
terms and is consistent, it is always possible to
produce alternative theories which share the same
set of observational consequences, which advance
clearly incompatible explanations at the theoretical
level for those observational consequences, and
which are equally well confirmed or disconfirmed by
any possible evidence. Since theories in art are
so radically underdetermined by any possible evidence,
the choice between competing theories is merely a
matter of convention.
2. Indeterminacy and Reference in Theories of Art
In the previous section I suggested that the notion
of meaning in art has an explanatory-referential role and
so should properly be located in the theories about art.
I will now turn to the problem of the nature of reference
in theories of art.
2.1 Conventionalism, Reference, and Truth
In the realist-conventionalist debate, it is uncontro-
versial that some theories of art are inadequate for
explaining certain phenomena. What is controversial is
how many adequate theories there are for a particular phe-
nomenon. The CT says that if any theory is adequate, then
many are adequate and the choice of one theory over another
is merely a matter of convention. Moreover, that there are
always incompatible interpretations which are equally well
supported by our observational evidence is thought to have
important consequences for a notion of reference of theore-
tical terms and, hence, for the truth of theoretical state-
ments containing those terms 1 : It is taken to show that
2.1.1 the terms of interpretations and explanations in
critical (as opposed to descriptive) art theory and
history cannot be seen as referring to (as true of)
extralinguistic entities, properties, events, rela-
tionships, etc. in any causal-explanatory way;
rather, their referents are -- in some important
sense -- either conventional (if the artworld agrees
upon them), subjective (if it does not), or relative
to some conceptual scheme.
I will argue that there are real referential relations
between our theoretical language and the world which make
possible the use of language in the social acquisition and
dissemination of knowledge, 2 that these relations are not,
in any interesting sense, relative to a conceptual scheme,
and that we should believe in a correspondence theory of
truth in interpretations and explanations of art and reject
2.1.1.
2.2 Indeterminacy, Methodological and Ontological
First, let us see why the CT should be thought to have
important consequences for the notions of reference and truth
in a realist epistemology of art. The argument is contained
in what I will call the Indeterminacy Lemma for the Con-
ventionalist Thesis. The reasoning is as follows:
(IL) Assume, for the moment, a realist attitude toward
truth. To adopt a realist attitude involves assuming
that a statement 's is true' is true (or false) if
and only if there is something (other than the
statement) in the world in virtue of which it is
true (or false). It can be shown that 's is either
true or false' is true only when there are facts
about the world in virtue of which either s is true
or s is false. This is to be understood as saying
that 's is either true or false' is true only if
relevant states of the world are such as to determine
the truth or falsity of s. Statements whose truth
or falsity can be determined (though is perhaps not
as yet determined) by relevant states of the world
-- call these statements descriptions -- are clearly
differentiated from those statements which are
plausible, reasonable, or defensible on evidence
provided by the relevant states but are nonetheless
underdetermined by the relevant states -- call
these statements interpretations. Since these later
statements, interpretations, are indeterminate,
there will always be incompatible interpretations
equally well supported by the totality of our
evidence. But, if we adopt a realist attitude
toward truth, then there is no sense in saying that
an interpretive statement is true unless we can find
relevant facts or causal connections which determine
that it is that one interpretation rather than another
which is correct. In other words, a realist attitude
requires that we conclude that interpretative state-
ments are neither true nor false, that there can be
no fact of the matter as to which of two incompatible
interpretations is correct because there are no facts
which would determine (decide) the truth of inter-
pretive statements. We must either say that inter-
pretations are neither true nor false or else inter-
pret truth in a non-realist (e.g., instrumentalist)
way. In short, true interpretations are incompatible
with realism.3
I think the conclusion drawn by the above argument is
incorrect. I will begin to show how it is incorrect by first
arguing that the conventionalist has not provided us with a
reason for thinking theories in art are typically under-
determined in the relevant sense by the totality of evidence.
Following Michael Friedman on translation theory,4 I
think that the IL is a conflation of two logically separate
forms: The first is a methodological form which concerns
the relationship between interpretations and explanations,
on the one hand, and the possible evidence and critical and
historical methods which we use to select between interpre-
tations, on the other. This is the form of the IL that
makes the claim that our evidence and methods do not deter-
mine a unique choice of interpretation; there will always
be incompatible interpretations which are equally well
supported by the "totality of our evidence." The other form
of the IL is an ontological form which concerns the rela-
tionship between our interpretations and explanations and
the "totality of facts." This is the form of the IL which
claims that there is no fact of the matter about correct
interpretation because there can be no relevant facts which
could determine that one interpretation is true to the exclu-
sion of another. It is not merely that we can never know
which is the correct interpretation, but that there is no
correct interpretation that we can either know or not know.
Interpretive statements are neither true nor false. Not only
are they not determined by all our evidence, they are not
determined by all the facts there are. I shall try to spell
out these two forms of the IL more precisely.
For simplicity we can think of a theory of a particular
artwork as a formal, first-order language whose domain is
a definite set of features of the artwork -- so all predi-
cates are predicates of features -- and further assume that
our language contains a distinguished set of observational
predicates. Now specify, for each observational predicate
'Ox' and each feature of the artwork f, whether 'Ox' is true
of f. I shall call such a specification a specification of
all possible evidence. One way for a theory to be methodolo-
gically determined by such a specification is for it to be
entailed by the specification. Thus a theory is methodolo-
gically determinate (is a "description" in the sense of the
IL) just in case every descriptive predicate 'Dx' of the
theory is contained in the specification of all possible
evidence, i.e., 3x(Dx=Ox) . In this form the IL is trivially
true for any theory that essentially contains non-observational
predicates.5 But the IL says more than that.
So now let us turn to the determination by the "totality
of facts." The facts that are to be included now are not
only ostensible facts, but all physical facts, i.e. facts
about physics, chemistry, biology, neurophysiology, psycho-
logy, history, sociology, anthropology, etc. Specify for
each primitive predicate of this set of facts, 'Px', and
each feature of the artwork, f, whether 'Px' is true of f.
I shall call a specification such as this a specification
of the totality of facts. What is it to say that a theory
is ontologically determined by such a specification? To
explicate this, let us begin by thinking of an interpretive
theory of a particular artwork as a function whose domain
is a set of "artistic" or "aesthetic" predicates,6 'Alx',
'A2x', . . . 'Anx', and which maps each of these predicates
'Aix' into a formula that contains no aesthetic terms. For
example, the theory might map the predicate 'has unity' into
a complicated formula, which I will abbreviate 'unity (x)',
which interprets the predicate in ostensible terms and terms
from neurophysiology, sociology, history, etc. that can be
understood independently of aesthetic terms. I will call these
formulas reduction formulas. So, a feature of the artwork
fl satisfies the formula 'unity (x)' if and only if fl has
unity. Similarly the sequence f2,egg satisfies the formula
'represents (x,y)' if and only if f2 represents an egg. A
set of reduction formulas,or a reduction scheme, will be said
to accord with a theory if it is possible to derive the theory
from the reduction formulas together with facts about the
physical world (physical facts about the artwork). I will
call a reduction scheme a physical identification just in
case the scheme, call it S, associates each aesthetic
predicate 'Aix' of the theory with an open sentence contain-
ing only physical predicates, i.e. if S('Aix') is coextensive
with 'Pix'. The ontology of the theory for which there is
a scheme that meets this requirement will be said to be
strongly determined by or strongly reducible to the totality
of physical facts. We can then define truth under the theory
T:
2.2.1 For each predicate 'Aix' and each feature of the
artwork f, 'Aix' is true of f under T iff there
exists a reduction scheme S which accords with T
and S('Aix')='Pix' where 'Pix' is true of f.
This kind of determination, however, is clearly too strong.
It is never the case that each aesthetic predicate corresponds
to a unique physical predicate, or to put it another way, a
physical state cannot be identified with an aesthetic quality
because there is no one physical state that is always present
when a feature of an artwork is, say for example, unified;
there are an indefinite number of distinct physical states
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that might function as the aesthetic quality unity. Never-
theless, particular instances of aesthetic qualities are
realized by particular physical states. So we can weaken
the notion of reduction by associating each aesthetic pre-
dicate, not with a single physical predicate, but with a
set of physical predicates. Let 'Alx', 'A2x', . . . 'Anx'
again be the set of primitive aesthetic predicates of the
theory T and let S' be a scheme which associates each 'Aix'
with a set of open sentences containing only physical
predicates, i.e. S'('Aix') = {'P X', P . Then
'Aix' is not coextensive with any single physical predicate,
but rather with a disjunction of physical predicates. I will
call a reduction scheme a physical realization just in case
S'('Aix') = 'P~x', 'iPx',.. . . .. A theory T is weakly
reducible just in case that there exists a mapping S' that
accords with it. We can define truth under the theory T:
2.2.2 For each predicate 'Aix' and each feature of the
artwork f, 'Aix' is true of f under T iff there
exists a reduction scheme S' which accords with
T and some 'Pax' Z) S'('Aix') where 'Pix' is true
-a.- -i
of f.
There may be other ways in which a theory could be
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physically determined besides by having what I have called
a physical identification or physical realization which
accords with it.7 I think, however, that these ways are the
most relevant to what the IL says about indeterminacy.
If what I have said so far is a fair interpretation of
the argument of the indeterminacy of theories of art, then
it should be clear that there are two very different forms
of the IL which concern relations between different terms:
the methodological form concerns a relation between inter-
pretations and a certain specification for each observational
predicate 'Ox' (whether 'Ox' is true of f); the ontological
form concerns a relation between interpretations and an
analogous specification for each physical predicate 'Px'.
Furthermore, if we assume that all observational predicates
are physically determined, then, while the ontological form
implies the methodological form, the methodological form does
not imply the ontological form. From the fact that an
interpretation is not determined by all observational
evidence, it does not follow that it is not determined by all
the physical evidence there is. And the IL has not provided
us with a reason for thinking that interpretative theories are
undetermined (in the relevant ontological sense) by the tota-
lity of physical facts. It has not provided us with a reason
for thinking that theories of art are any different from any
other high-level theory (like chemistry or biology) in this
respect.
I have not been able to find a clear argument for the
ontological claim of the IL.8 Jeffrey Olen, however, is
explicit in denying the possibility of any physical identi-
fication or physical realization of an interpretive theory
and, hence, the possibility of any truth-value as defined
in 2.2.1 or 2.2.2.
Let us ask, then, whether there is any reason to
believe that for any work of art there will be only
one correct interpretation, such that the statements
belonging to that interpretation (i.e., the statements
of the theory) are true, and no statement attributing
aesthetic qualities to the work which does not belong
to the interpretation is true. I do not believe that
there is any reason to accept that position.
Consider the nature of these theories. They are
explanations of the work, but explanations of a very
different sort from scientific explanations. They
explain why a work has the qualities it does. They
explain the nontheory-laden qualities (those which
the work will be said to have regardless of one's
interpretation), the colors and lines and shapes, etc.,
by unifying them in a certain way. They also explain
the theory-laden qualities, the aesthetic qualities,
those qualities which, we may say, are posited by the
theory, by showing them to be suitably connected to
each other and to the nontheory-laden qualities. Such
explanation is not causal explanation. To explain the
work by appealing to the artist's beliefs and desires,
his skills, the constraints imposed by his materials,
is not to give an aesthetic explanation. It is not
to give an interpretation of the work. Given a set of
such proposed explanations, all of which compete with
one another, only one can be true. Raphael either
wanted the areas representing Mary's hands in his
Bridgewater Madonna to express grace and tenderness or
he did not. Given two such proposed explanations, one
saying that he did and one saying that he did not, one
must be false. Nor are aesthetic explanations reduc-
tive explanations. To show that there is a set of true
statements about the molecular structure of the mate-
rials of a work of art, e.g., the paint, and that an
area is of a certain color if and only if the paint has
a certain molecular structure is not to give an aesthe-
tic explanation. And once again, if there are two such
proposed explanations which are incompatible, one must
be rejected. Either the painthas a certain molecular
structure or it does not.
Now it might be argued that the areas representing
Mary's hands either express grace and tenderness or
they do not. But how can such an argument be sustained?
Consider the difference between the predicate "is
graceful," on the one hand, and "wants the area to be
graceful" and "has a certain molecular structure," on
the other. Desires and structures play important roles
in our psychological and physical theories, respectively.
They are determinate states with determinate places in
a variety of causal chains. Predicates such as "is
graceful" play no such role in our psychological or
physical theories. There are no laws of physics which
allow us to say that gracefulness is caused by X or
causes Y, or that gracefulness can be reduced to X or
that Y can be reduced to gracefulness. Nor are there
any corresponding psychological laws. A person's belief
that something is graceful may play a number of roles
in a number of causal chains, but so may his belief that
something is a unicorn. In neither case need we worry
about the truth value of "X is graceful" or 'X is a
unicorn."9
We probably do not have reduction schemes for predicates like
'is graceful' right now. But I do not see this as sufficient
reason for not looking for them, for supposing that there are
none. I do not take this as a reason for accepting the
conclusions of the IL.
2.3 Argument for the Ontological Claim
While I have not been able to find a clear argument
for the ontological claim of the IL, I do think there is
something to the claim. What there is, I think, is contained
in the denial of the "aesthetic/non-aesthetic distinction."
Now the denial itself is uncontroversial with respect to
the realist-conventionalist debate. The ontological claim
this denial is taken to support, however, is not. I shall
now try to develop the claim.
Frank Sibley, in a well-known series of papers raises
some questions which have become central to contemporary
aesthetic debates. Broadly speaking, the issue is this:
Given that there are aesthetic judgments, (a) we must decide
whether they are "objective," "cognitive," "self-evident,"
etc., or, generalizing, whether they have truth-values; and
if they do have truth-values, (b) we must determine whether
an aesthetic judgment can be inferred from any conjunction
of non-aesthetic judgments; this will probably require that
(c) we determine how the terms found in aesthetic judgments
are related to other terms. Sibley addresses these issues
by invoking an aesthetic/non-aesthetic distinction.
The remarks we make about works of art are of many
kinds. . . . We say that a novel has a great number
of characters and deals with life in a manufacturing
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town; that a painting uses pale colors, predominantly
blues and greens, and has kneeling figures in the fore-
ground; that the theme in a fugue is inverted at such
and such a point and that there is a stretto at the
close; that the action of a play takes place in the span
of one day and that there is a reconciliation scene in
the fifth act. Such remarks may be made by, and such
features pointed out to, anyone with normal eyes, ears,
and intelligence. On the other hand, we also say that
a poem is tightly-knit or deeply moving; that a picture
lacks balance, or has a certain serenity and repose,
or that the grouping of the figures sets up an exciting
tension; or that the characters in a novel never really
come to life, or that a certain episode strikes a false
note. It would be neutral enough to say that the making
of such judgments as these requires the exercise of
taste, perceptiveness, or sensitivity, of aesthetic
discrimination or appreciation; one would not say this of
my first group. Accordingly, when a work or expression
is such that taste or perceptiveness is required in
order to apply it, I shall call it an aesthetic term or
expression, and I shall correspondingly speak of aesthetic
concepts or taste concepts. 12
About the relation of aesthetic and non-aesthetic terms
Sibley claims
. . . aesthetic terms always ultimately apply because
of, and aesthetic qualities always ultimately depend
upon, the presence of features which, like curving or
angular lines, color contrasts, placing of masses, or
speed of movement, are visible, audible, or otherwise
discernible without any exercise of taste or sensibility.
Whatever kind of dependence this is, and there are
various relationships between aesthetic qualities and
non-aesthetic features, what I want to make clear . . .
is that there are no non-aesthetic features which
serve in any circumstances as logically sufficient
conditions for applying aesthetic terms. Aesthetic
or taste concepts are not in this respect condition-
governed at all.13
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The applicability of an aesthetic concept cannot be inferred
from the applicability of any number of non-aesthetic concepts.
Sibley holds, nevertheless, that aesthetic discrimination is,
in some sense, perceptual or perception-like (informed by
taste or perceptiveness) and that aesthetic judgments do
have truth-values; their characteristic terms -- aesthetic
terms -- apply to certain properties -- aesthetic properties
-- which are knowable to the person with taste.
Many authors attack the very distinction between
aesthetic and non-aesthetic perception. They challenge the
pragmatic or functional consistency of the claim that the
extra-perceptivity of taste is invariably required in making
an aesthetic judgment, that normal intelligence and senses
are not enough. 4 They challenge the logical uniformity of
those distinctions that Sibley regards as involving aesthe-
tic judgments and attempt to show that among the concepts
which are supposed to be non-conditioned governed, we must
admit salient predicates that actually are conditioned-
governed. 15 Finally, they claim that even among the concepts
that are condition-governed, it is never the case that they
are condition-governed in such a way as to lead to judgments
which are straightforwardly true or false.16 Consequently,
the IL proponents see Sibley's position as subject to a
complex dilemma: either (a) his aesthetic concepts are
condition-governed (since dependent on non-aesthetic features)
and thus enter inferentially into judgments that are true
or false; or (b) they are not condition-governed (though
they are dependent) and since they enter into judgments that
are true or false, Sibley is committed to some sort of
intuitionism; or (c) they are not condition-governed (though
dependent) and enter into judgments which may be apt or
plausible or defensible, etc., but not true or false.17 The
conclusions that the IL wants to draw from the denial of the
aesthetic/non-aesthetic distinction are the following:
2.3.1 Aesthetic judgments are not determined by (though
they are dependent on) non-aesthetic features of
the artwork.
2.3.2 Aesthetic qualities are not in any obvious way
(barring ad hoc intuitionism) directly accessible
to any cognitive faculty (perceptual for instance);
so aesthetic judgments are not determined by any
perceptual1 8 facts.
2.3.3 Thus, not only is interpretation not determined by
the observational facts, it is not even determined
by the totality of observational plus perceptual facts.
51
We are left with this:
2.3.3' The totality of observational plus perceptual facts
does not ontologically determine the truth or falsity
of interpretive statements (where determination by
observational + perceptual facts is defined like
determination by physical facts except "o+p predicate"
is substituted everywhere for "p predicate.")
I think this is the argument the conventionalists can
offer. But all this is still far from the ontological form
of the IL. I think what is wrong with this argument is the
premise that facts about works of art must be determined
(methodologically and ontologically) by perceptual facts.
It is not obvious that observational + perceptual facts
exhaust the available evidence. The set of observational
+ perceptual predicates is only a small part of the set of
physical predicates. Therefore, it is natural to suppose
that there are other, physical but not directly perceptual,
facts which do determine interpretation, that there are
non-perceptual physical facts to which interpretive theories
are reducible.
There is another argument for the indeterminacy of
interpretations,however, which can be explicated in terms of
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reference and the correspondence theory of truth. The
argument is simply this: the interest-relativity of
explanation leads to (possible) indeterminacy of reference
and, hence, to the indeterminacy of truth. This argument
recognizes the need to replace a strictly perceptual or
perception-like thesis with one that accommodates the
relevance of background considerations (history, biography,
intention, etc.) and also of individual sensibilities and
appreciative orientations, of beliefs about the subject
matter of art, and of the distinctively cultural nature of
art 9-- in short, the way we structure our explanation
space, given what we consider the relevant domain of the
inquiry to be.
This argument is particularly strong because it is
based on many premises which the realist embraces. Parti-
cularly, if as realists we reject the notion of a priori
truth and the notion of a fixed, unchanging scientific
method of gaining knowledge, if we regard the methods of
doing art history and theory as enmeshed in and evolving
in history, then we will be unlikely to see a distinct gap
between our methods and the content of our knowledge. 20
The difficulty with this argument is that it seems to be
concerned exclusively with methodological determination.
It can, however, be connected up with the ontological
(reductive) form of determination: Assume, for a moment
that a set of truths Q ontologically determines a theory
T; then Q should, in principle, methodologically determine
T since the truth and falsity of each sentence in T is
settled by Q. So if Q could not in principle methodologically
determine T, then Q does not ontologically determine T.
If we combine the denial of the aesthetic/non-aesthetic
distinction with the above interest-relativity argument,
we get the following:
2.3.4 There is a non-interest-relative description (in the
sense of description defined by the IL) of an
artwork -- a true description determined by non-
interest-relative, perceptually accessible facts.
2.3.5 In order to talk about the truth of an interpretation
we would have to have similar perceptual access to
non-interest-relative facts which would determine
the interpretation.
2.3.6 But, we cannot perceive such determining facts; aes-
thetic concepts cannot be compared to unconceptualized
reality; interpretation is interest-relative.
2.3.7 Therefore, we cannot say that an interpretation is
true (if we want to continue to think of truth as
correspondence to facts or "reality").
There are two important assumptions underlying this
conclusion: One is that, in order to have truth, there
must be a theory-independent fact of the matter as to what
an aesthetic term in a given theory corresponds to. The
other is that being in a position to know that such and such
is actually the case presupposes knowing what the corres-
pondence is. On this account truth is prior to meaning.
This has the consequence that truth is radically non-
epistemic.21 It is this view that I want to reject in
what follows. In order to do this I will briefly discuss
three examples of reference in theories of art.
But first, it will be helpful to restate the Indeter-
minacy Lemma in terms of reference and correspondence:
(IL') Assume for a moment a realist attitude toward
truth. To adopt a realist attitude involves assuming
that a scheme of reference (a reduction scheme
containing the term 'denotes') is to be understood
as making claims about a pre-existing relation
between language and the world. The truth value of
a sentence is determined by the denotation of its
component names, extensions of its component predi-
cates, etc. So if a term t really bears a denotation
relation to o or g, then every adequate reference
scheme must say that it does; and if t does not bear
the denotation relation to o or a, then every ade-
quate reference scheme must deny that it does. This
means that if we adopt a realist attitude toward
truth, then we must conclude that no two adequate
reference schemes can differ as to which terms denote
which objects or properties. If it is not the case
that one is correct and all others incorrect, it
follows that none is correct. This conclusion rules
out a correspondence theory of truth for such cases.
Now let us turn to the examples which will lead us to
reject IL'.
2.4 "The Egg"
The first example comes for a famous series of debates
in the literature of art history concerning the ovoid object
painted in Piero della Francesco's Montefeltro Altarpiece.22
The object has been alternatively interpreted as a pearl,
an ostrich egg, and the egg of Leda. We can express the
competing interpretations in schematic form:
2.4.P The ovoid should be seen in conjunction with the
conch shell in the painting as representing the
Byzantine conception of the Virgin as a shell that
bore the divine pearl or as referring to the legend
that a pearl is formed by the opening of the shell
of the mussel to receive the due of heaven. 23
2.4.0 The ovoid represents an ostrich egg, symbolizing
miraculous conception and nativity and alludes to the
popular belief that the donor's son had been conceived
with divine assistance. Accepting the ostrich egg
as a symbol of conception and birth, and recognizing
the sleeping Child in the painting as a prefiguration
of the dead Christ, and the shell as a symbol of
resurrection, the central, vertical unit of the compo-
sition describes the Incarnation, the Passion, and
the Resurrection. 2 4
2.4.P and 2.4.0 are each supported by the same observational
evidence but they assign different interpretations to the ovoid
in Piero's painting. Clearly on the CT there is no deciding
between them. I contend that in fact there is good reason to
choose 2.4.0 over 2.4.L.
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In defense of 2.4.0 there is a background theory, call
it E, which is constituted by a network of collateral evidence.
This network includes material on the ostrich and its eggs in
literature and in ecclesiastical use; it establishes corres-
pondences between the elements of Piero's painting and a
frescoe in Lodi with a known ostrich egg in a position and
function similar to Piero's ovoid and between the circumstances
in the lives of the donors of the two works; it offers a
reconstruction of the architectural space in which the ovoid
is hung and calculations of the size of the object which is
represented, demonstrating that the object is large enough to
be an ostrich egg; etc. This last piece of evidence is based,
in turn, upon further collateral evidence showing that Piero
was such an accurate painter that it is possible to reconstruct
his perspective spaces in this way.
With this I can make my first point: Even though 2.4.P
and 2.4.0 have the same observational consequences, they
are not equally supported or disconfirmed by any possible
evidence. Indeed, in the light of current theoretical knowledge
E, it is highly implausible that 2.4.P is true even though it
has no falsified observational consequences. On the other
hand, the observational evidence from Piero's paintings provides
indirect evidence that E is true. (Cf: 1.4.4.)
Now consider another interpretation:
2.4.L The ovoid does represent an egg and does symbolize
the divine birth, but it is not the egg of an
ostrich; rather it should be seen as the egg of
Leda which Pausanias said hangs in a temple.2 5
2.4.L uses the same network of evidence in E to argue
against 2.4.0. By the same calculations of the perspective
space it claims that the size of the object is too large
to be that of a natural bird's egg, even an ostrich, and
is thus apparently man-made or imaginary; by the same
comparison with the Lodi frescoe, it claims that since
Piero's egg does not have a band around it to ensure against
breakage, as does the Lodi frescoe, and as would any natural
egg used as an artifact, then Piero, the accurate painter
that he was, could not have been representing an ostrich egg.
The egg of Leda is the only plausible alternative that is
compatible with E.
The debate goes on, but I can make my second point
here: If and only if we assume that 2.4.0 is a roughly
referentially accurate, causal-explanatory account of Piero's
painting and that theory E is approximately true will the
collateral information supplied by theory E confer plausability
on 2.4.L which coheres with E in the sense of preserving
the accurate theoretical knowledge of E as a limiting case.
(Cf: 1.4.4.) In the absence of such collateral information
the particular conditions here crucial to the plausibility
of proposal 2.4.L might be of no particular importance.2 6
And while at this point it seems that the referent of the
theoretical term 'the egg' is ambiguous as between an
ostrich egg and the egg of Leda, that we cannot yet say
what the single thing is that the term refers to, 'the egg'
is nevertheless playing a referential role in our theoretical
language by affording us epistemic access to the information
about ostrich eggs, Leda's egg, Piero's painting, etc. even
though it does not uniquely refer.
We can strengthen this with the second example.
2.5 "Unity"
In his Principles of Art History Heinrich Wolfflin
remarks on the differences between the "multiple unity"
of fifteenth century pictorial composition and the "unified
unity" of the sixteenth century.
. . . at the very moment at which we name unity of
composition as an essential feature of Cinquecento
art, we have to say that it is precisely the epoch
of Rapheal which we wish to oppose as an age of multi-
plicity [multiple unity] to later art and its tendency
to unity [unified unity]. And this time we have no
progress from the poorer to the richer form, but two
different types which each represent an ultimate form.
The sixteenth century is not discredited by the seven-
teenth, for it is not here a question of a qualitative
difference but of something totally new.2 7
Thus
. . . Durer's impressive woodcut of the Virgin's Death
outstrips all previous work in that the parts form a
system in which each in its place appears determined
by the whole and yet looks perfectly independent. The
picture is an excellent example of a tectonic composition
-- the whole reduced to clear geometric oppositions
-- but, beside that, this relationship of (relative)
co-ordination of independent values should always be
regarded as something new. We call it the principle
of multiple unity. 28
On the other hand
. . . the baroque would have avoided or concealed the
meeting of pure horizontals and verticals. We should
no longer have the impression of an articulated whole:
the component parts . . . would have been fused into
a total movement dominating the picture. If we recall
the example of Rembrandt's etching of the Virgin's
Death, . . . the play of contrasts does not cease, but
it keeps more hidden. The arrangement of obvious side-
by-side and clear opposite are replaced by a single
weft. Pure oppositions are broken. The finite, the
isolable, disappear. From form to form, paths and
bridges open over which the movement hastens on unchecked.
. . . Such a stream is unified in the baroque sense,
[unified unity].29
Leo Steinberg, speaking of Rauschenberg,seems to use "unity"
in a third way.
When in the early 1960's he [Rauschenberg] worked with
photographic transfers, the images . . . kept inter-
fering with one another; intimations of spatial meaning
forever canceling out to subside in a kind of optical
noise. The waste and detritus of communication -- like
radio transmission with interference; noise and meaning
on the same wavelength, visually on the same flatbed
plane. This picture plane . . . could look like some
garbled conflation of controls system and cityscape.
. . . To hold all this together, Rauschenber's picture
plane had to become a surface to which anything reachable-
thinkable would adhere. . . . [etc.] 3 0
In the three cases there is an apparent conflict between the
uses of the term 'unity'. It seems to refer to one quality
when Wolfflin speaks of fifteenth century painting, another
when he speaks of sixteenth century painting; and the same
term refers to yet another quality when Steinberg speaks of
Rauschenberg. We can put the competing uses schematically:
2.5.1 The term 'unity' denotes the co-ordination of inde-
pendent forms in a relationship of geometric
opposition.
2.5.2 The term 'unity' denotes the cessation of the inde-
pendent functioning of the individual values and
the development of a dominating total motive.
2.5.3 The term 'unity' denotes the picture plane's confla-
tion of mutually interfering individual forms.
Conventionalism and realism agree on the following: We
cannot decide between hypotheses 2.5.1, 2.5.2, and 2.5.3, as
to what 'unity' denotes. The claims are each extremely
plausible (or each would be plausible were it not for the
existence of the other two) and there is no basis for choosing
between them. But the IL' concludes that since there are
mutually incompatible claims of equal plausibility; we must
say the term 'unity' is denotationless -- that it denotes no
real property whatsoever (or else interpret reference in some
non-realist way). The realist, on the other hand, says that
the word 'unity' is referentially indeterminate and that
sentences which contain referentially indeterminate terms can
have perfectly determinate truth-values.
I shall now argue that even if terms are referentially
indeterminate, we should keep a correspondence theory of truth
and reject the IL'. We will see that the problem is not that
the term 'unity' lacks denotation (in any straightforward
sense); on the contrary, there are too many qualities which
seem to satisfy the criteria for being the denotation of the
term. Where the IL' is wrong is in again assuming that if
'unity' is to have denotation, there must be a prior relation
of determinacy.
First, let me show why I think terms such as 'unity'
are not denotationless. Hartry Field has suggested that
Leibniz's principle
2.5.L If two terms each denote the same object, then sub-
stitution of one term for the other (in nonquotational,
nonintentional, etc., contexts) always preserves truth
value (or lack of truth value).
has a counterpart for non-denoting terms:
2.5.L' If two terms each denote nothing whatsoever, then
substitution of one term for the other (in nonquo-
tational, nonintentional, etc., contexts) always
preserves truth value (or lack of truth value).
In other words
If two terms have no denotation whatsoever, they are
completely alike from a denotational point of view; so
how could substitution of one for the other affect truth
value? The answer that will be given by any advocate of
referential semantics is that it couldn't: if substi-
tution of one term for another affects truth value, these
terms must be different from each other denotationally
speaking, and that means that they are not both simply
denotationless. 31
Using Field's principle 2.5.L', we can show that the
term 'unity' as used in 2.5.1, 2.5.2, and 2.5.3 is not deno-
tationless: We are given this sentence from Wolfflin:
2.5.W In Rembrandt's Deposition, unity fulfills itself
in many ways: there is unity of color as well as
of lighting, and a unity of the composition of
figures as of the conception of form in a single
head or body.32
Many would like to say 2.5.W is true. I suppose the IL' would
say that it is neither true nor false, that it lacks truth
value. But suppose that we replace the word "unity" in 2.5.W
with 'unity' from 2.5,3. Clearly, no one will regard the
new sentence 2.5,W' as true. Neither is it truth valueless.
It is false. But if 'unity" were denotationless, the substi-
tution of "unity" (2.5,3) for "unity" (2.5.2) should not have
affected the truth value (or lack of it).
If 'unity' is not denotationless, it might be contended
that our inability to choose between 2.5.1, 2,5.2, and 2.5.3
is due simply to ignorance -- that one of the hypotheses is
correct to the exclusion of the others, but we just do not
know which. But, suppose for a moment that one is really
true and the other two false -- that the term 'unity' denotes
the co-ordination of independent forms in a relationship of
geometric opposition (2.5.11 and nothing else. Then, it should
be possible to find a reductive formula 'unityCxl' such that
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tunity(painting)' is true of each painting which has inde-
pendent forms co-ordinated in a relationship . . . etc. and
is not true of anything else.33 In other words it should be
possible to find facts about the way that 'unity' is used
in virtue of which this word refers to one quality and nothing
else. But any physical facts which inform the use of 'unity'
in 2.5.1 also inform 'unity' in 2.5.2 and 2.5.3; and any
causal links between 'unity' 2.5.1 and uses of 'unity' are
also causal links between 'unity' 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 and uses
of 'unity'. I think that there are no physical facts that
would decide between those three possible denotations. It
seems that in this case there is no prior fact of the matter
as to what 'unity' denotes.
The foregoing argument shows the referential indetermi-
nacy of the term 'unity'. (It does not say anything about
methodological or ontological indeterminacy.) It follows on
the IL' that referential indeterminacy rules out the possi-
bility of a correspondence theory of truth for theories using
such terms. What I claim, however, is that a correspondence
theory is still possible; Hartry Field34 has shown how. He
has proposed the introduction of certain more general corres-
pondence relations between words and extra-linguistic objects
and properties -- that of "partial denotation" and "partial
signification". Recall the difficulty with the relation of
denotation was that we had to choose between the respective
uses in 2.5.1, 2.5.2, and 2.5.3 without physical basis. But
using partial denotation we can say that the term 'unity'
bears this correspondence relation to all the properties
predicated of it in 2.5.1. 2.5.2, and 2.5.3. Moreover, the
existence of such correspondence relations can be used in
explanations of truth and falsity. Recall from 2.2 that a
reduction scheme which accords with a theory T is a function
that maps the terms and predicates of T into physical objects
and relationships. Once we remember the existence of referen-
tial indeterminacy, however, we lose the ability to single
out a unique reduction scheme. What we can do, though, is
introduce a class of reduction schemes, each of which partially
accords with the theory T just in case each term 't' or
predicate 'Aix' of T partially denotes or partially signifies
S''('t') or S''('Aix'). We can then define true in terms of
"true-in-S''" and "partially accords" (to say that a sentence
is true-in-a reduction scheme is to say that it would be true
if all the terms in the sentence were determinate and if they
denoted or signified just those entities which the reduction
scheme assigns to them):
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2.5.4 A sentence of T is true iff it is true-in-S'' for
every reduction scheme S'' that partially accords
with T.35
This allows us to say that 'unity' has undergone a
denotational refinement 36; that is, the relationships that
'unity' partially denoted in each of 2.5.1, 2.5.2, and 2.5.3
were proper subsets of the set of relationships that it
denotes now.
It should be emphasized that the existence of referential
indeterminacy shows only that the relations of denotation and
signification are not well-defined in certain situations. But
Field's more general relations of partial denotation and partial
signification are nevertheless perfectly objective relations
between words and extralinguistic objects, properties, etc.,
and are not in any interesting sense relative to a conceptual
scheme or merely a matter of convention.
2.6 "Newton's Laws"
The final example comes from Arthur Danto's "The Artworld."
Two painters are asked to decorate the east and west
walls of a science library with frescoes to be respectively
called Newton's First Law and Newton's Third Law. These
paintings, when finally unveiled, look, scale apartas
follows:
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A B
As objects I shall suppose the works to indiscernible:
a black, horizontal line on a white ground, equally
large in each dimension and element. B explains his
work as follows: a mass, pressing downward, is met by
a mass pressing upward: the lower mass reacts equally
and oppositely to the upper one. A explains his work
as follows: the line through the space is the path of
an isolated particle. The path goes from edge to
edge, to give the sense of its going beyond. If it
ended or began within the space, the line would be
curved: and it is parallel to the top and bottom edges,
for if it were closer to one than to another, there
would have to be a force accounting for it, and this is
inconsistent with its being the path of an isolated
particle.
Much follows from these artistic identifications.
To regard the middle line as an edge (mass meeting
mass) imposes the need to identify the top and bottom
half of the picture as rectangles, and as two distinct
parts (not necessarily as two masses, for the line could
be the edge of one mass jutting up -- or down -- into
empty space). If it is an edge, we cannot thus take the
entire area of the painting as a single space: it is
rather composed of two forms, or one form and a non-
form. We could take the entire area as a single space
only by taking the middle horizontal as a line which is
not an edge. But this almost requires a three-dimensional
identification of the whole picture: the area can be
a flat surface which the line is above (Jetflight), or
below (Submarine-path), or on (Line), or in (Fissure),
or through (Newton's First Law) -- though in this last
case the area is not a flat surface but a transparent
cross section of absolute space. We could make all
these prepositional qualifications clear by imagining
perpendicular cross sections to the picture plane.
Then, depending upon the applicable prepositional clause,
the area is (artistically) interrupted or not by the
horizontal element. If we take the line as through
space, the edges of the picture are not really the edges
of the space: the space goes beyond the picture if the
line itself does; and we are in the same space as the
line is. As B, the edges of the picture can be part
of the picture in case the masses go right to the edges,
so that the edges of the picture are their edges. In
that case, the vertices of the picture would be the
vertices of the masses, except that the masses have
four vertices more than the picture itself does: here
four vertices would be part of the art work which were
not part of the real object. Again, the faces of the
masses could be the face of the picture, and in looking
at the picture, we are looking at these faces: but space
has no face, and on the reading of A the work has to
be read as faceless, and the face of the physical object
would not be part of the artwork. Notice here how one
artistic identification engenders another artistic
identification, and how, consistently with a given
illustration, we are required to give others and pre-
cluded from still others: indeed, a given illustration
determines how many elements the work is to contain.
These different identifications are incompatible with
one another, or generally so, and each might be said
to make a different artwork, even though each artwork
contains the identical real object as part of itself
-- or at least parts of the identical real object as
part of itself. There are, of course, senseless iden-
tifications: no one could, I think, sensibly read the
middle horizontal as Love's Labour's Lost or The
Ascendency of St. Erasmus. Finally, notice how accep-
tance of one identification rather than another is in
effect to exchange one world for another. We could,
indeed, enter a quiet poetic world by identifying the
upper area with a clear and cloudless sky, reflected
in the still surface of the water below, whiteness kept
from whiteness only by the unreal boundary of the
horizon.
And now Testadura, having hovered in the wings through-
out this discussion, protests that all he sees is paint:
a white painted oblong with a black line painted across
it. And how right he really is: that is all he sees
or that anybody can, we aesthetes included. So, if he
asks us to show him what there is further to see, to
demonstrate through pointing that this is an artwork
(Sea and Sky), we cannot comply, for he has overlooked
nothing (and it would be absurd to suppose he had, that
there was something tiny we could point to and he, peering
closely, say "So it is! A work of art after all!"). We
cannot help him until he has mastered the is of artistic
identification and so constitutes a work of art. If he
cannot achieve this, he will never look upon artworks:
he will be like a child who sees sticks as sticks. 37
In Danto's story, what A and B each have that Testadura
does not have is a theory which accounts for their interpre-
tation. If we let A's theory be Ta and B's theory be Tb,
we can state the conventionalist argument for the impossibi-
lity for a reduction scheme for either of the theories thusly:
A theory Ta according to which the predicate 'represents empty
space' refers to a feature of the artwork f is just as legi-
timate as a theory Tb according to which the predicate 'repre-
sents a mass' refers to the same f; but clearly a reduction
scheme which accords with Ta would fail to accord with Tb and
a reduction scheme which accords with Tb would fail to accord
with Ta So, by the IL' we must conclude that there can be
no reduction scheme in the broad sense, i.e., in the sense
in which both theories could be said to be true.
With this argument emerges the full inappropriateness
of the thesis that there must be one correct theory in order
to keep a realist account of truth. There is an important
relation of reference-in-Ta which the predicate 'represents
empty space' bears to f and which the predicate 'represents
a mass' does not bear to f; there is a different relation
of reference-in-Tb which the predicate 'represents a mass'
bears to f and which the predicate 'represents an empty
space' does not bear to f. Furthermore, if we want to
develop a theory in terms of one of these relations, then
there is a point to asking for a reference scheme which
would give an account of that relation by reducing it to
more ontologically basic properties and relations of a kind
relevant to the inquiry (e.g., by what I have called a
physical realization). But there is no sense in wanting an
account of one of these relations to apply to the other as
well. Wanting such an account again assumes a pre-existing
theory-independent fact of the matter as to what a term in
a given theory corresponds to -- i.e. assumes that truth is
radically non-epistemic.
This is not to say that Ta and Tb are equally true but
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incompatible (pace Danto). A and B each recognize the exis-
tence of the physically specified relations reference-in-Ta
and reference-in-Tb and they will surely agree they are
different. What is more, we could construct a fairly syste-
matic permutation $ that would map the physically specified
relations of A's theory into those of B's. So by using $
together with the reduction formulas he uses in his physical
specification, each could define the permuted relations that
his "opponent" uses. His opponent's theory then turns out
to be a set of truths about these permuted relations (assuming
his own theory is a set of truths about the "normal" rela-
tions)38 Thus the realist position is not committed to there
being one and only one true theory. The realist account can
handle equivalent identifications.
Examples 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 show the following: Some
terms, like 'the egg,' play a referential role in language
by affording epistemic access to one or more things, proper-
ties, relations, etc. even if they do not refer. Other terms
like 'unity,' are not well-defined in certain situations but
there, nevertheless, may be an objective relation of partial
denotation which obtains between the term and more than one
thing, property, relation, etc. Furthermore, such terms may
undergo denotational refinement. Finally, a realist account
of reference is not committed to there being one and only
one reduction scheme which applies to all correct theories
at once.
So if we take the critical theory and history of art
seriously and at "face value," 39 then it looks as though the
concepts of reference and truth are not epistemically neutral
as the IL claims. There is not a theory-independent relation
of reference between a theoretical term and something in the
world which must be known prior to our use of the term in
theoretical debates. Interpretation and explanation in art
theory are rational activities involving (reliable) inductive
and deductive inferences, reason giving, justification, and
theoretical disputation to supplement and extend observation
and perception; truth and reference are epistemological
notions in which the relation between language and the world
makes possible the use of language in the social, collective
acquisition, dissemination, and refinement of knowledge.
All this suggests that, because accommodation of theoretical
language to the world in the light of new knowledge is part
of reference, changes in language use which change the refe-
rent of a term need not indicate the lack of correspondence;
such changes can sometimes represent reports of new discoveries
instead. Both 2.4 and 2.5 are examples. Furthermore, it
suggests that the sorts of considerations which rationally
lead to modifications of, or additions to, existing theories
involving a term t are, typically and over time, indicative
of respects in which those theories can be modified so as
to provide more nearly accurate descriptions, when the term
is understood as referring to an object o or property p.
The tendency over time, then, is for such a rationally
conducted inquiry to result in theories involving the term
which are increasingly accurate when understood to be about
the object o or property a.
In this section I have argued that the terms of our
theories of art can be understood as referring to extra-
linguistic objects and properties. In the next section, I
will suggest that the theoretical mechanisms in critical
theory and history of art do operate to produce increasingly
true accounts of the relations obtaining between the entities
quantified over in the theories.
3. COHERENCE, EVIDENCE, AND OBJECTIVITY IN THEORIES OF ART
The purpose of this section of the thesis is to suggest
that theories in art may reveal a complexity in their struc-
ture such that the theory-laden constraints on critical judg-
ments which act to produce consensus may be consensus-producing
because they are (indirectly) evidential of the correctness
of the critical judgments and of the theoretical principles
of art which account for them.
3.1 Critical Judgments and Theories
That there are conventional, methodological constraints
on interpretive statements which operate so as to contribute
to the likelihood that accepted interpretations will be rela-
tively reliable accounts of the observational evidence may be
recognized by both the conventionalist and the realist posi-
tions. But the claim of the CT is that satisfaction of those
constraints is sufficient to satisfy all the explanatory
purposes for which the interpretive theory was introduced;
the CT denies the possibility that those causal relations
which a theory describes could explain the regularities in
observable phenomena.
Arthur Danto1 has recently begun to develop an account
of the role of theory in art which suggests some ways in
which the claims of the CT might be challenged with a more
robust alternative. Furthermore, many of Danto's views are
compatible with a realist epistemology of art of the sort
I am trying to develop. Danto's conception of the role of
theory in art is such that an art theory is analogous to a
moral theory or a scientific theory; in its broad purpose,
an art theory, like any other, is an attempt to explain or
help us better understand a given body of data. For Danto,
an interpretation must provide something like semantical
directions for grasping the meaning of art. Recall that in
the discussion of the ontological determination of theories
of art in 2.2, we saw that it is possible to construe a
theory of art as a function whose domain is a set of what I
called "artistic" or "aesthetic" predicates and which maps
each of these predicates into a formula which should expli-
cate the various aesthetic properties in a way that can be
understood independently of the aesthetic predicates. In
Danto's terms these aesthetic predicates are the judgments
of those artists, critics, historians, theorists, patrons,
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etc., who have "mastered the is of artistic identification,"
those who have been steeped in "an atmosphere of artistic
theory, a knowledge of history of art: an artworld,"2 or what
could be called, borrowing from John Rawl's familiar phrase,
the considered aesthetic judgments of competent aesthetic
judges. A successful theory explicates the considered
judgments of competent judges by providing a set of princi-
ples which, when applied in concrete situations, account for
or generate them. Thus, we have, initially, a two-tiered
structure consisting of
(I). a set of critical judgments or interpretations of com-
petent judges,
plus
(II) a set of theoretical principles of art which explicate
them.
Furthermore, theories are indispensable to the activity of
making competent, considered judgments. Danto says
But telling artworks from other things is not so simple
a matter, even for native speakers, and these days one
might not be aware he was on artistic terrain without
an artistic theory to tell him so. And part of the
reason for this lies in the fact that terrain is con-
stituted artistic in virtue of artistic theories, so
that one use of theories, in addition to helping us
discriminate art from the rest, consists in making art
possible.3
This sounds very much like the epistemological account I
have been urging.
However, the reflective nature of the two tiers in art
theory raises two areas of difficulty. Danto is explicit in
stating that a theory of art does not consist of definitions
showing forth THE ART we already know. Nor does a theory
have any a priori validity; theories are subject to revision.
There is, then, first, a danger of circularity. For, the
theoretical principles are operative in critical judgments
and interpretations, and the judgments and interpretations
are what the theory attempts to explicate. Richard Sclafani
states the problem this way:
A theory in [Danto's] sense is what a given art commu-
nity shares (e.g., the community of Post-Impressionist
artists, critics, and so forth); and a theory is what
makes possible the artistic enfranchisement of works
produced within a community, (The 'artworld'). Conver-
sely, however, what a given art community shares, what
makes the work of practitioners within a community
possible, is a theory. It becomes clear that an art-
world must be identifiable independently of its theore-
tical or paradigmatic structure. Only then is it
possible for theories or paradigms, in Danto's sense to
be articulated in a non-circular way by doing such things
as carefully examining the works of art, works of cri-
ticism, etc. produced within a given artworld.4
The problem of circularity identified by Sclafani stands,
aside from his Kuhnian implications. A second difficulty,
also pointed out by Sclafani, is the possibility of conflict-
ing considered judgments among various competent judges. If
a theory of art is to explicate the critical judgments and
interpretations, against which set of considered judgments
is the adequacy of a theory to be tested? For example, the
theoretical accounts, explanations, and justifications for
the emergence and entrenchment of non-representational art
vary considerably. Do all, or which, of these accounts
closely approximate Danto's theoretical revision, "RT"?5
Problems such as these have led Scalfani and others to
challenge the adequacy of an account of a theory of art such
as Danto's. I shall argue that some version of this account
may reveal a greater complexity than Danto's critics (or,
perhaps, Danto himself) have realized and, consequently,
may provide a model for a theory which permits a reconsi-
deration of the plausibility of objective and true critical
judgments and principles.
A first refinement, coming from the model of moral theory
as advanced by Rawls, is a distinction between the set of
theoretical principles (II), and relevant background theories.
In proposing alternative sets of principles (II), we do not
simply settle for "best fit" of principles with judgments
(I); rather, we advance arguments intended to demonstrate
the relative strengths (and weaknesses) of the competing sets
of principles in (II). That is, there should be evidence
that the artistic principles are not merely models or sys-
temizations or accidental, arbitrary generalizations of
the critical judgments. 6
3.2 The Strategy
In what follows, I will be concerned to show that the
kind of evidence which confers plausibility on the competent,
considered judgments and interpretations which explain
particular works of art is, in turn, evaluated in the light
of plausibility judgments based on a body of collateral in-
formation which functions to bring it about that the theories
underlying the critical judgments are accurate as accounts of
the actual relations described in the theories rather than
as reflecting arbitrary conventions. I shall use the
structure of the strategy used by Boyd to defend realism in
empirical sciences. Following that strategy, I shall attempt
to
3.2.1 find a methodological principle P which involves
inter-theoretical considerations of plausibility of
the sort we are investigating,
3.2.2 argue that the employment of P contributes to the
likelihood that accepted theories of art will be
reliable in the sense of producing true beliefs in
actual situations as well as true beliefs in counter-
factual situations,
3.2.3 argue that the only plausible explanation for the
reliability of P lies in the assumption that it
operates with respect to background theories which
themselves reflect the actual relations among theo-
retical entities in such a way as to make it likely,
in turn, that newly accepted theories will provide
approximately true accounts of the considered judg-
ments (I) as well as the artistic principles (II).
3.3 Principle P
A methodological principle that might come to the mind
of most art historians is this:
(Pl) When formulating art theories, we define a series
of conceptual constants to form a base upon which
to measure the degree of innovation in each artistic
experiment and to allow a dynamic comparison between
our conceptual categories on the one hand and the
experimental evidence on the other.
This principle is likely to produce increasingly reliable
accounts due to the accommodation of our conceptual cate-
gories to the causal relations among theoretical entities.
However, it seems to depend on the part of the realist claim
1.4.4 which says that new theories should prima facie,
resemble current theories with respect to the content of
their theoretical knowledge. The conventionalist might
also accept this as a desideratum for the assessment of
the plausibility of a new theory but it turns out that one
will count such criteria as reflecting evidence relevant
to the support of a proposed theory if and only if one has
already adopted 1.4.4. We need a better argument.
Another principle which is suggested by the arguments
against ontological indeterminacy in section 2 is:
(P2) In explaining theories of art, we do not rely on
"ultimately artistic" facts or properties; there is
no appeal to a special artistic realm outside the
scope of other sciences.
That there are no ultimately artistic facts is to be taken
to be saying the same thing about theories of art that Field
8.
says about semantics, i.e., that there are no artistic facts
or properties over and above the facts and properties of
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physics, chemistry, biology, neurophysiology, philology,
psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, etc. If this
ontological view is correct and if one assumes that the theories
employed in the theories of art we accept stand for real pro-
perties, then P2 has the consequence that
3.3.P2 the terms employed in the theories of art we accept
stand for properties and relations that are not
"ultimately artistic;" the properties are expli-
cable in terms of other, "physical" properties; and
the facts about art involving these properties
follows from these explications together with facts
of physics, neurophysiology, etc.
Given P2 and 3.3.P2 together with 2.2.2, one has a very
strong claim for the possible truth of theories of art.
But P2 rests crucially not only on the assumption that there
are no irreducibly artistic facts or properties, but also on
the assumption that semantics is to be interpreted realist-
ically. Even if the conventionalist accepts P2, he need not
accept a realist semantics. So, while I think P2 and 3.3.P2
are true, I have not been able to show that the terms of art
theories refer to real properties beyond the arguments for
the possibility that they do and the examples 2.4, 2.5, 2.6.
There is, however, a common criterion for determining
the acceptability of art theories which is neutral to most
philosophical positions and which may have more interesting
results than Pl. The criterion is whether or not the theories
rule in as art objects those objects we consider paradigmatic
art works and rule out as art paradigmatic non-art objects. 9
(For example, a common reason for rejecting Tolstoi's theory
is that it turns borderline cases such as folktales into
paragons of artworks while denying the status of art to
Beethoven's symphonies and King Lear.) Accordingly, the
methodological principle which I will use is:
(P) In making considered critical judgments which explain
or interpret a work of art, we construct theories about
the object as a work of art, thereby discriminating
between the work of art and relevant perceptually
equivalent objects which are not art.
Using Goldman's analysis of perceptual equivalents, we can
specify an object of art by an ordered triple consisting of
1) an object, b
2) a maximal set of (non-relational) properties, J
3) a relationship between the object and its context, R
Thus, (b,J,R) fully characterizes an object of art.
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Given P, consider the following example: Suppose that
it is 1915-17 and, as art theorists, we are confronted with,
and want to explain, readymades by Duchamp -- bottle rack,
shovel, urinal. Given the state of theoretical knowledge
that is operative in explicating works of art at this time,
call it T-1915, together with the standard auxiliary state-
ments like "what the work denotes, signifies, represents,
or expresses may not be external to the object, but may
emerge simultaneously with the experience of the object,"
call these statements Al, the theory cannot explain why
these objects should be considered objects of art and,
therefore, cannot interpret them. We can express the situa-
tion in the following schematic way:
Theory: T-1915
AS :Al
Fact to be explained: that the readymades could be
presented as art
The problem, then, is to find further assumptions -- auxi-
liary hypotheses, artistic principles, explanatory laws --
about the conditions of the artworld which supply sufficient
conditions for the acceptance of such objects as art, or
explain them. A large number of solutions would do the work
required by such additional statements. For example, we
could say that all bottle racks, snow shovels, and urinals
are works of art for some ad hoc reason, and that no one
before Duchamp had realized it. Or, we could say that the
person (the factory worker) who actually made these objects
intended to depict or represent King Lear, an equestrian
statue of Caeser, and the Madonna, in the bottle rack, snow
shovel, and urinal, respectively, but that he was not a very
realistic-minded artist (or a very good one). If we did not
want our explanation to approximate the truth, then any
statement like the ones above would do. I would like to urge
that, by applying P, we get the one statement that would be
plausibly true, A2: "the readymades are art rather than ordi-
nary objects by the mere fact of their having been inscribed
by the artist, Duchamp." So a perceptual equivalent of one
of the readymades is (b,KR) , where K is the set of pro-
perties that does not contain the property of having been
inscribed by the artist. 12
Thus, this mechanism P is reliable because it not only
produces true beliefs in actual situations, but would produce
true beliefs, or at least inhibit false beliefs, in relevant
counterfactual situations. (If a urinal had been exhibited
by a plumber, we would not have counted it as art.) Also,
P is neutral with respect to most theoretical positions,
including conventionalism. (It is not, however, neutral with
respect to a theory which allows, say, accidental art; theories
such as this are ruled out by P.)
3.4 Recognizing Art
I shall now argue the following important result about
principle P: that P would fail to be reliable in the sense of
producing true beliefs in actual situations and inhibiting
false beliefs in counterfactual situations, unless the colla-
teral theories with respect to which plausibility judgments
about relevant conterfactuals are made are approximately
true and unless P contributed to the likelihood that accepted
theories are likewise approximately true. In order to see
how it might be plausible to take P as contributing to the
likelihood that our accepted theories of art will be reliable,
true generalizations, we must first see how the expression
"art" or "work of art" is acquired. Unlike some expressions
in our language which are acquired by means of a definition
which either fixes the expression's reference or extension,
the expression "art" is acquired by way of paradigmatic
example.13 Given a limited number of examples of art,
members of the "artworld," the competent judges, must
infer the relevant characteristics of the open class of art
and, in effect, predict new instances of art, that is, count
as art new things related in the correct, relevant way to
the paradigms. In other words, they must formulate a rule
for projecting the expression "art" from the paradigms to
new instances. And, as the number of paradigms increases,
they must construct ever more sophisticated rules. Robert
Matthews makes the observation that "l) Initiates are inva-
riably successful in acquiring the expression 'art,' and 2)
their success is achieved in virtue of their exposure to
paradigmatic examples of art."1 4
The reader may suggest that the successful use of the
expression "art" is just a matter of convention, that the
initiates are simply "in tune" with accepted usage of the
term "art" and with the dispositions of others in the art-
world. Kennick puts the claim this way:
If anyone is able to use the word "art" or the phrase
"work of art" correctly in all sorts of contexts and
on the right occasions, he knows "what art is" and no
formula in the world can him wiser.15
This view then is based on the following assumptions:
3.4.1 Knowing "what art is" is just a matter of being able
to recognize artworks
3.4.2 Those who have acquired the expression "work of art"
are in fact able to recognize artworks.
This is, in fact, not the case. There are different kinds
of competence which are required from the initiates of
different areas of the artworld. Students in the M.I.T.
Department of Architecture, for example, have a certain
minimum level of competence in that they know many paradig-
matic examples of art and can recognize art in most situations.
But when confronted with such contemporary pieces as Carl
Andre's Hartford rocks, few would be able to perform with
the same competence merely on the basis of knowing the
commonly accepted usage of the term "art." The linguistic
competence they have is of little use in projecting from
the paradigms to new instances at the cutting edge of art
history. Most of us must rely on an expert who has a method
of recognizing whether something is a work of art or not,
what we have called a theory of art, which is more than
knowing the conventional usage of the term.16
The insistent conventionalist will probably make the
rejoinder that cases of admitting new pieces into the exten-
sion of "art" is just a matter of agreement, a matter of
deciding whether the concept of art should be extended to
include such-and-such a piece, whether that piece is art.
But, the matter is not that simple. There is often disagree-
ment about presumptive claims to art status. Justification
is required to support the decision, to demonstrate that
the piece in question is related to the paradigms in the
relevant way. And since, in new instances, the appropriate
relation is not apparent a priori, the justification must
specify what the relevant relation is taken to be. Such a
specification entails the construction of a theory which
states, makes explicit, generalizations about the nature of
art since nothing less than this sort of generalized state-
ment of principles can possibly establish the relevancy
between the putative piece and the paradigms. This theory
need not be well-formed systematic theory, but must be
public in such a way that it can be criticized, defended,
elaborated, and adjusted if it is to do the work required
of it.
3.5 Coherence and Revisability
I shall now argue that a plausible explanation for the
reliability of P in the construction of theoretical princi-
ples lies in the assumption that it operates with respect
to background theories which themselves reflect the actual
relations among theoretical entities in such a way as to
make it likely, in turn, that newly accepted theories will
also provide approximately true accounts at the level of
considered judgments as well as at the theoretical level.
I cannot prove such a claim. But, I am urging that the
claim is plausible and deserves consideration. I shall
begin by formulating the concept of theory of art in such
a way as to maximize coherence and the chance of revisability
and, thus provide a way of giving evidence for the accepta-
bility of theoretical principles in a way which is indepen-
dent of the "fit" with the set of competent critical judg-
ments. Consider the following example. Suppose that A
is a set of considered judgments which includes critical
interpretations such as Cortissoz's remarks on a drawing of
Van Gogh: "The laws of perspective are so strained. Landscape
and other natural forms are set awry. So simple an object
as a jug containing some flowers is drawn with the uncouth-
ness of the immature, even childish, executant." The set
of artistic principles B which explicates such considered
judgments would include such principles as "Art is to be
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understood as imitating natural form or significant human
action." Background theories C would include theories of
history, theories of perception and cognition, as well as
theories about the causation of art and its role in society.
These background theories have the property that they incor-
porate a range of concepts beyond the scope of the theore-
tical principles. Thus C has independent support from non-
artistic events in history, psychological experiments in
perception and cognition of form, and the role of art in
culture, etc. We can imagine there being some sort of
equilibrium in the multiple influential constraints of
A,BC) . Now, suppose A' is a set of judgments significantly
disjoint from A including such statements as the interpreta-
tions and justifications of Picasso, Matisse, Cezanne, etc.
by Bell-Fry, Dewey, etc. Note that A' plays a role in
constraining the background theories in C. For example,
think of the effect that Post-Impressionist art interpreta-
tions had on psychological theories of perception (illusion,
space, figure-ground, simultaneity, movement, etc.). More-
over, A' has the consequence that the principles in B will
have to be revised or discarded if another set of principles
say B' which would include, for example, "Art need not be
understood as unsuccessfully imitating real forms, but rather,
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as successfully creating new ones, quite as real as the
forms which the older art had been thought to be imitating"
(Danto's RT),17 is demonstrated to be preferably coherent
to A' by plausibility and coherence considerations from C.
Recognizing the complexity of the structure of theories in
art, of which the above is only a sketch, allows revisions
of critical judgments and interpretations to based on theory
rather than on arbitrary or accidental conventions. I take
this as frustrating the claim that satisfaction of any con-
ventional constraints exhausts the explanatory purposes of
a theory.
In the model I have outlined, no judgment, principle,
or background theory is held fixed, but is subject to a
matrix of mutual support or constraint and revision. Consi-
der the following sketch of the ways in which a judgment
may be subject to revision.
3.5.1 Supposea judgment in A plays a role in determining
the acceptability of C. Then, if testing C against
other, more plausible background theories C' leads
us to reject C, then we must revise A.
3.5.2 Suppose a judgment in A constrains C in such a way
that C entails some principles in B and, consequently,
other judgments which we cannot accept; A is
subject to revision..
3.5.3 Suppose a judgment in A is relevant to establishing
B. If B is revised as a consequence of C, then A
is subject to revision.
etc.
A similar logic would reveal patterns of revision for the
theoretical principles in B and the background theories in
C. The point is this: The complex structure of art theories
makes those theories and the interpretations and explanations
generated by them subject to revision and refinement over
time.
3.6 Coherence and Convergence
Without argument, I take it to be a fact about theories
of art that later explanatory theories in art typically cohere
with the earlier theories they replace in the following ways:
3.6.1 They keep the same paradigms
3.6.2 They imply many considered judgments similar if not
identical to those of earlier theories as a limiting
case
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3.6.3 They keep the same theoretical mechanisms of the
earlier theories as a limiting case
It should not be assumed that 3.6.1 is in any way necessarily
true (and certainly not analytically true). It is not a
necessary part of the meaningl8 of "art" that paradigms such
as Cezanne's watercolors for example, are works of art, even
though they may be part of our intension of "art." (Inten-
sion does not determine meaning or extension. 19) It may in
fact be very unlikely that Cezanne's watercolors should turn
out not to be art after all but it is for theoretical reasons,
not analytic reasons. The paradigm's relative immunity to
rejection is by virtue of the role it plays in the construc-
tion of theories: A work's acceptance as a paradigm usually
entrenches its status as art because it will be used to con-
struct and test other theories which explain the nature of
art. But, on the other hand, we could be grossly mistaken
about our acceptance of a paradigm such as Cezanne's water-
colors as works of art. It is my view that our mistake will
be revealed because theories are testable and subject to
radical revision. Paradigms are kept because we believe they
have been rationally accepted as art on the basis of theo-
retical justification and are believed to be, in fact, works
of art.
If later theories are to be better than earlier ones
we would expect something like 3.6.2 to be the case, that
the new theory would retain the competence of the old theory
by accounting for whatever the old one did and to explain
heretofore recalcitrant facts. If we did not want our
theories to approximate the truth about the nature of art,
and did not want subsequent theories to be closer to the
truth than the theories they replaced, we need not expect
later theories to imply similar or identical judgments and
interpretations as those of earlier theories as the limiting
case. (It should be noted here that in some cases when,
as a result of a radical theoretical revision, theories are
changed in such a way as to admit new pieces as instances
of art, not only are these pieces taken up as art, but other
things are taken up as art as well. Also, newly significant
features of accepted artworks are sometimes found, allowing
quite different accounts of their status as art. [See
Danto's 'ontological victory' argument.20] While this may
not be an indication of the truth of our theories it is an
indication of our belief in the truth of our theories.)
From 3.6.2, it does not follow that theories must imply
the approximate truth of the theoretical mechanisms, principles
and laws, of the earlier theories in particular circumstances
-- which they typically do. Admittedly, such a retention is
partly due'to inertia or preference and to the fear that
complete revision will threaten the unity of all art. But
such accounts do not explain the epistemological success of
theories in accounting for the complex phenomena of art.
Consider the following example. Suppose IT21 is the received
theory of art at the advent of Post-Impressionist paintings.
In terms of this theory it was impossible to account for the
Post-Impressionist work; but, the IT explained all art up to
that time. It was an extremely powerful, and highly corrobo-
rated theory. So, if I am a theorist trying to find a theory
to replace IT, then my proposed theory must have the property
that the laws, principles, and mechanisms of IT are appro-
ximately true when judged from the standpoint of my new
theory, T2. Otherwise, my theory T2 will (probably) have
no chance of being true. Thus, I will only consider candi-
dates for being T2 which have this property -- which imply
the laws and principles of IT as a limiting case.22 It is
a historical fact that several alternative theories were
offered at this time, varied to be sure, but all more or less
defined in terms which kept the judgments and interpretations
generated by the IT for major paradigms plus accounting for
the heretofore anomalous, controversial pieces. This is
what Danto has called the RT.
Now, if the methods of art theory are successful in the
sense that they produced convergence and growth of knowledge
of the kind that I have urged, then it is at least plausible
that the account of the success of these methods is that they
lead us, over time, to better and better approximations to
truths of the kind relevant to the inquiry if there are any.
Because of the coherence, (A,B,C) , of the various elements
of the artistic inquiry, A, B, C, and the coherence of
subsequent theories with earlier theories, this coupled with
the pressures to revise and eliminate the divergent concepts
for which there are reasons to eliminate, it seems that a
research program which would account for the reliability
and consensus-producing nature of theories of art with the
argument that they are reliable and consensus-producing
because they are evidential (indirectly) of the approximate
truth of the critical judgments, interpretations, and theo-
retical principles of art, is a research program worth
serious attention. While my arguments here have been specu-
lative and have only outlined possibilities, I think they
suggest that a reconsideration of the plausibility of objec-
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tively true critical judgments, interpretations, and
theories in art is in order; they suggest that a full-
blown realist epistemology of art might prove fruitful in
delineating the sphere of our knowledge.
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(0) NOTES
1. The quote by Putnam is from [59]: 5.
2. [35]: 69.
(1) NOTES
1. For example, Panofsky's second level of meaning is
"apprehended by realizing that a male figure with a
knife represents St. Bartholomew, that a female figure
with a peach in her hand is a personification of veracity,"
etc. His third level of meaning "is apprehended by as-
certaining those underlying principles which reveal the
basic attitude of a nation, a period, a class, a religious
or philosophical persuasion--qualified by one personality
and condensed into one work.... A really exhaustive
interpretation of the intrinsic meaning or content
might even show that the technical procedures charac-
teristic of a certain country, period, or artist,...
are symptomatic of the same basic attitud that is dis-
cernible in all the other specific qualities of his
style." [48]: 30-31.
2. "...it is important to not that the statement 'this figure
is an image of St. Bartholomew' implies the concious
intention of the artist to represent St. Bartholomew...."
[48]: 30. (I should emphasize that Panofsky's theory
of meaning is more sophisticated than one which is based
on just an intentional or conceptual activity.)
3. [79]: 306.
4. [79]: 114.
5. [79]: 95.
6. [79]: 113.
7. [79]: 219.
8. [79]: 222.
9. Cf. also [531, [54] , [56].
10. [20].
11. [57]: 259.
12. [33] and "Nelson Goodman's Languages of Art"
13. [33]: 52.
14. [331: 22.
15. [79]
16. [33]: 146-147.
17. Quoted in [72].
18. [72]: 98.
19. [72]: 121.
20. [72]: 122.
21. Cf. Panofsky [48]:
22. Concerning 1.3.5 and 1.3.6, cf. Evans (24]:
23. In [57].
24. While this proposal challenges much of the literature
in aesthetics, I
[18], Diffey [22]
Silvers [70].
think it is compatible with Danto
, Jarvie [35], Roskill [61], and
[17],
25. Cf. Putnam [57]: 227-229.
26. [6].
27. In Putnam [58].
28. Putnam [59]: 22.
(2) NOTES
1. There is an intimate connection between reference and
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in [79].
30-31.
xv.
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truth. Indeed, 'P refers to x' is equivalent to 'P
is true of x.' Cf. especially Field [25] and Putnam's
John Locke lectures in [59].
2. My notion of reference is based on Boyd's [11].
3. I think this is a fair reconstruction of the argument,
especially as in Matthews [43].
4. Friedman sees Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of
translation as taking two logically separate forms
[29]. For the logic of reduction schemes cf. also
Field [28].
5. We saw some of the problems with theories which concern
only ostensible properties in section 1 of this thesis.
6. I do not mean to be making a technical distinction between
aesthetic and non-aesthetic predicates (cf. 2.3). I
take the aesthetic predicates to be simply those used
in critical judgments and interpretations.
7. In saying that a theory is physically determined, I mean
to be saying the same thing that materialists say about
psychology, that anti-vitalists say about biology, and
that physicalists say about semantics.
8. Matthews [43] is a normative account, as is Margolis [41].
9. [47]: 428-429.
10. [66], [67], [68].
11. Cohen [14].
12. [66]: 63-64.
13. [66]: 66.
14. Cohen [14].
15. Kivey [37].
16. Margolis [41].
17. Margolis [41].
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18. My use of "perceptual" here is intended to be consistent
with Margolis's use in [41] and [42].
19. Cf the essays in Aagaard-Mogensen [1].
20. Cf. Boyd [6].
21. On the epistemic nature of truth, cf. Putnam [59].
22. Gilbert [30], Meiss [45], [46], Ragusa [60], and others.
23. Meiss [46].
24. Ragusa [60].
25. Gilbert [30].
26. Compare to 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.3, 1.4.4.
27. [78]: 156.
28. [78]: 161.
29. [78]: 161.
30. [71]: 85-88. Unfortunately (for my example), Steinberg
does not actually use the word "unity." I think that
"holds all this together" implies "unity."
31. [26]: 472.
32. [78]: 158.
33. Cf. 2.2.
34. [26], [27].
35. Cf. [27].
36. Cf. [26], [27].
37. [17]: 577-579.
38. Cf. Field [28].
39. Putnam says that science taken at face value implies
realism. [59] : 37.
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(3) NOTES
1. [17], [18], [19].
2. [17]: 580.
3. [17]: 572.
4. [63]: 164.
5. [17].
6. I am indebted to Norman Daniels and Richard Boyd for
helping make this point. Cf. also [16].
7. In [6].
8. In. [28].
9. For example, see Silvers [69].
10. [32].
11. This "relationship" in this simplified example should
be thought of as a non-theory laden relationship such
as the date of b etc,
12. Again, in this simplified example, I am taking "being
inscribed by the artist" to be a non-relational property.
Something further should also be said about R.
13. I am indebted to Robert Matthews and Hilary Putnam for
discussion on this point.
14. [44].
15. [36]: 321-322.
16. Deference to experts is discussed in Boyd [8] and
Putnam [50].
17. [17]: 573.
18. That is, the meaning of the term "art."
19. Cf. section 2.
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20. In [18] .
21. Danto's "Imitation Theory." Cf. [17].
22. Compare to 1.4.4.
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